Toward a better union: improving the effectiveness of foreign policies by Bradshaw, Daniel J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-06
Toward a better union: improving the effectiveness
of foreign policies
Bradshaw, Daniel J.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
TOWARD A BETTER UNION: IMPROVING THE 








Thesis Co-Advisor:  Erik Dahl 
Thesis Co-Advisor: Gary Langford 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
TOWARD A BETTER UNION: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
FOREIGN POLICIES 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel J. Bradshaw 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
A fundamental characteristic of state-state interaction in a globalized system is the explicitness with which states 
communicate their foreign policies to each other. 
In order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy explicitness in the global foreign policy 
system, I first created a simple mesh model of the actors and institutions that form the U.S. foreign policy system. By 
optimizing this model with various systems engineering concepts, I discovered that foreign policy explicitness plays 
an important role in improving the effectiveness of the foreign policy system as a whole. I then applied this result to 
an analysis of U.S-China foreign policy relations since 1949 in order to determine how foreign policy explicitness has 
affected real-world state-state relations. By following the development of U.S.-China relations, I found that increases 
in foreign policy explicitness have been the precursor to many of the most important bilaterally beneficial 
developments in the U.S.-China relationship. Finally, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better 
understand the current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. I discovered that the U.S. is actively undertaking 







14. SUBJECT TERMS United States, China, Foreign Policy, Communication, Foreign Area Officer 
(FAO), Foreign Service Officer (FSO), Department of Defense, Department of State, Epistemic 
Community, Systems Engineering, Internet, Digital Collaboration, Politics, Military, Effectiveness, 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
149 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Daniel J. Bradshaw 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The Ohio State University, 2006  
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Mohammed M. Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv




A fundamental characteristic of state-state interaction in a globalized system is the 
explicitness with which states communicate their foreign policies to each other. 
In order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy explicitness 
in the global foreign policy system, I first created a simple mesh model of the actors and 
institutions that form the U.S. foreign policy system. By optimizing this model with 
various systems engineering concepts, I discovered that foreign policy explicitness plays 
an important role in improving the effectiveness of the foreign policy system as a whole. 
I then applied this result to an analysis of U.S-China foreign policy relations since 1949 
in order to determine how foreign policy explicitness has affected real-world state-state 
relations. By following the development of U.S.-China relations, I found that increases in 
foreign policy explicitness have been the precursor to many of the most important 
bilaterally beneficial developments in the U.S.-China relationship. Finally, I examined 
the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the current state of U.S. 
foreign policy explicitness. I discovered that the U.S. is actively undertaking many 
initiatives that are increasing U.S. foreign policy explicitness; however, more can be done 
to focus this process. 
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A fundamental characteristic of state-state interaction in a globalized system is the 
explicitness with which states communicate their foreign policies to each other; however, 
it remains unclear how explicitly states should communicate their foreign policy intent, 
or what means of communication they should use. Each foreign policy communication 
method within the full array of options a state has falls along a spectrum of foreign policy 
explicitness that ranges from low explicitness to high explicitness.  
On the low end of the spectrum, a state's precise foreign policy objectives are 
difficult for foreign entities to discern. For example, military force deployments without 
any accompanying explanation, while certainly a strong show of resolve, do not clearly 
communicate precise foreign policy intent. On the higher end of the spectrum, a state's 
foreign policy objectives are clearly communicated, and foreign entities can respond 
more explicitly in return. For example, the deployment of military force is much higher 
on the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness when it is preceded by explicit public 
statements of foreign policy intent, concurrence on the validity of the foreign policy by a 
united multi-national coalition, and broad domestic support. While this is an ideal case, it 
is clearly not always a viable option for states participating in the complexities of the 
global environment. In return for such a high level of explicitness, a more precise 
determination of the cause and effect relationship between foreign policy communication 
and foreign entity response can be drawn. Understood in this sense as a feedback loop, 
there should theoretically exist some way to maximize foreign policy explicitness, and 
thereby also help states maximize the effectiveness of their foreign policies. In this thesis, 
I explored the concept of foreign policy explicitness in a few different ways. 
First, in order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy 
explicitness in the global foreign policy system, I created a simple mesh model of the 
actors and institutions that comprise the United States (U.S.) foreign policy system. The 
field of systems engineering provided an inspirational, fresh perspective in this regard. 
From a systems perspective, foreign policies can be modeled as discrete systemic units, 
which can then be further broken down into their elements in order to understand the 
 xvi
procedural realities of the foreign policy system. By analyzing the lifecycle of a single 
foreign policy, it becomes easier to see the role that explicitness plays in making a single 
foreign policy maximally effective and fit for purpose. A brief example of the foreign 
policy lifecycle flow helps to visualize the foreign policy system. In both democratic and 
meritocratic political systems, as domestic support for a particular foreign policy 
increases to some threshold level of legitimacy, a state begins the process of 
communicating that foreign policy to external entities. This foreign policy 
communication takes some form, and in aggregate can be positioned somewhere along 
the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness. In receipt of such foreign policy 
communication, foreign entities then respond in whatever way they deem appropriate, 
thereby providing foreign policy feedback into the original state's domestic environment. 
As a complete system, these and other intermediate steps form a foreign policy feedback 
loop that is continuously operating. By optimizing my foreign policy system mesh model 
through a supply chain analysis using various systems engineering concepts like 
currency, modularity, and uniqueness, I discovered that increasing foreign policy 
explicitness also increases foreign policy effectiveness. Yet, while this is certainly an 
interesting theoretical idea, does it match with reality? I explore the answer to this 
question through an analysis of U.S.-China relations. 
As a second approach at understanding the importance of explicitness in the 
foreign policy system, and building upon the results of my foreign policy systems model 
optimization, I conducted an analysis of U.S.-China foreign policy relations since 1949 in 
order to understand the role that foreign policy explicitness has played in real-world 
state-state relations. By following the development of U.S.-China relations, I discovered 
that increases in foreign policy explicitness have been the precursor to many of the most 
important bilaterally beneficial developments in the U.S.-China relationship. Both the 
United States and China communicate foreign policies across the full spectrum of foreign 
policy explicitness, but I argue that it was only upon a foundation of increasing levels of 
foreign policy explicitness that each successive step in the improvement of U.S.-China 
relations was made possible. Looking at how the post-Korean War diplomatic stalemate 
between the U.S. and China in 1970 thawed into secret diplomatic talks, and talks turned 
 xvii
into official Communiques, and bilateral agreements grew into complex multi-national 
trade frameworks, it is evident that there is a correlation between the explicitness of 
foreign policy communication and new levels of foreign policy system stability, 
effectiveness, and mutual benefit. To restate, my analysis indicates that increasingly 
explicit foreign policy communication can be positively correlated with increasing levels 
of mutually beneficial positive feedback, which in turn forms a foundation for future 
mutually beneficial iterations of the foreign policy systemic feedback loop. These results 
have intriguing implications. For example, the results imply that before improvements in 
the foreign relations of countries can occur, some party in the foreign policy system must 
increase explicitness first. Accordingly, an important question is whether the United 
States is moving to increase or decrease the explicitness of its foreign policies. I explored 
the answer to this question by looking at a few recent developments in the U.S. foreign 
policy system. 
For my third and final look at the importance of explicitness in the foreign policy 
system, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the 
current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. Accordingly, I conducted a brief analysis 
of the U.S. Department of Defense's Foreign Area Officer program, the Department of 
State's Foreign Service Officer program, the concept of Three Diplomatic Tracks, and the 
current state of the art of foreign policy metrics. In so doing, I discovered that the U.S. is 
actively undertaking many initiatives that are increasing U.S. foreign policy explicitness; 
however, more can be done to focus and optimize this process within the United States, 
and more should be done to encourage other states to follow suit. In my concluding 
section, I provide a few concrete recommendations for how the United States can proceed 
in augmenting its foreign policy system to make it more effective. 
 xviii




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND BACKGROUND 
Does increasing the explicitness1 of foreign policies also increase their 
effectiveness? 
States communicate their foreign policy objectives to other states in a variety of 
ways. For example, a state can signal its intent to attack another state in many ways: 
amassing military forces on its borders, passing domestic legislation that leads to a war 
resolution, or sending an explicit written statement of hostile intent through its foreign 
emissaries. Similarly, a state can signal an intent to cooperate in a variety of ways as 
well: reducing provocative military maneuvers, drafting domestic legislation that 
removes barriers to trade, or signing bilateral executive agreements. The difference 
between each of these methods of communication can be found in the explicitness with 
which they communicate intent. On the low end of the foreign policy explicitness 
spectrum, military movements without an accompanying explicit diplomatic explanation 
can lead to miscalculation and a corresponding decrease in state-to-state trust.2 On the 
higher end of the explicitness spectrum, a state’s intent is made perfectly clear in black 
and white, with a corresponding increase in state-to-state trust. Going one step further, 
notwithstanding the possibility of defection that is more likely in single iteration 
interactions between states, increasing the amount of trust between two states through 
multiple confidence-building measures (CBM) increases the stability of their relationship 
                                                 
1 The usage here of the word “explicit” is semantically closer to the meaning of “quantized,” as 
opposed to “verbalized.” In such a very narrow sense of the word, when foreign policies are made 
“explicit” through “quantization,” they are codified in a written form that explicates the qualities and 
characteristics of specific foreign policies in a discrete, line-item by line-item manner, leaving little to no 
room for confusion about a given country’s stated foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis a particular issue. 
2 Throughout this thesis, I make reference to “Trust” in one of two ways, but it is my opinion that both 
uses are fundamentally the same.  In one sense, Trust means “predictability” in that some amount of trust is 
a necessary prerequisite to complex, mutually beneficial interaction, and an increase in state-to-state trust 
raises the foundation for increasingly complex and mutually beneficial relations between states. Trust (T)  
is also used to indicate “legitimacy.” For example, when citizens in representative governments vote on 
their leaders or decide not to overthrow their governments, they are providing legitimacy into the policy 
systems of their governments in the form of trust. In the latter part of this thesis, I use T as a variable to 
describe the flow of trust/legitimacy through the foreign policy system. 
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and likelihood of mutually beneficial relations.3 Altogether, I argue that increasing the 
explicitness of foreign policies leads to increasing stability and profitability in the 
international system. I analyzed the role of foreign policy explicitness in international 
relations from a few perspectives. 
First, in order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy 
explicitness in the global foreign policy system, I created a simple mesh model of the 
actors and institutions that form the U.S. foreign policy system and optimized the model 
with a supply chain analysis. My supply chain analysis uses Trust (T) as a currency of 
analysis,4 and uses the systems engineering concepts of currency, modularity, and 
uniqueness to treat a single foreign policy as a discrete, meshed system of interacting 
elements.5 The results of my supply chain analysis show that inefficiencies and 
breakdowns in foreign policy communications between nodes in the foreign policy 
system degrade the system as a whole, and efforts at increasing foreign policy 
explicitness and thereby maximize T have the potential to improve the effectiveness of 
the system as a whole. Yet, while this is certainly an interesting theoretical idea, does it 
match with reality? I explore the answer to this question through an analysis of U.S.-
China relations. 
As a second approach at understanding the importance of explicitness in real-
world state-state relations, and building upon the results of the optimization of my foreign 
policy systems model, I conducted an analysis of U.S.-China foreign relations since 1949. 
Compared to the pre-rapprochement years before Nixon visited China in 1972, relations 
between the United States and China have greatly improved in many subjective measures 
                                                 
3 Bruce Russet, Debating the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 100. 
Institutional constraints make it hard to go to war, and especially hard to plan surprise attacks. 
4 Whereas trust can be used as a subjective measurement of the stability of a relationship like that of 
the U.S. and China, Trust as a variable T can also be used as an objective measurement of the same 
relationship from a systemic, quantitative perspective. 
5 Gary Langford, Toward A General Theory of Systems Integration: Research in the Context of 
Systems Engineering (South Australia, AU: University of South Australia, 2012), 147–148. Similar to how 
the entirety of a state’s foreign policy can be broken down into explicit and discrete objects that apply only 
to particular countries, systems engineering literature advises engineers to quantize complex systems into 
fundamental, modular systemic units and explicitly define the relationships between them. 
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like effectiveness and stability, and also improved in many objective measures like 
interdependence and productivity. Before rapprochement, U.S.-China relations were 
largely based on tacit understandings of each other’s policies and indirect reporting of 
capabilities and intent.6 There were few official avenues through which the U.S. and 
China could make explicit expressions of foreign policy to each other, leading to 
correspondingly low levels of state-state trust. Since rapprochement, the number of 
signed bilateral and multilateral policy agreements between the U.S. and China—through 
both direct diplomatic efforts and multilateral institutions—has increased in tandem with 
the mutual profitability and levels of trust in the relationship.  This relationship between 
foreign policy explicitness and mutual profitability is either correlative or coincidental. 
While I do not rule out the possibility of other co-traveling variables, it is likely that a 
correlation exists, and that further increases in the explicitness of U.S. and Chinese 
foreign policies toward each other will lead to further improvements in U.S.-China 
relations. Indeed, the process of further increasing explicitness within the U.S.-China 
foreign policy system is already underway, and the results are apparent in a few key 
developments within the U.S. foreign policy system. 
For my third and final look at the importance of explicitness in the foreign policy 
system, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the 
current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. Efforts at increasing explicitness within 
the U.S. foreign policy system can be found in many places: the expansion of U.S.-China 
foreign policy communication from a single track in 1972 to the three separate tracks of 
diplomacy that are now used,7 the recent revitalization of the U.S. Navy’s Foreign Area 
Officer (FAO) program, and the increasing role that digitization has played in forcing 
institutions to explicitly define the semantic relationships between their policies, actions, 
and results. I show that each of these and other examples, in one way or another, 
increases the explicitness of the foreign policies that flow in a cyclical manner through 
                                                 
6 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War–A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 106. 
7 Diana Chigas, “Track Two (Citizen) Diplomacy, Beyond Intractability,” last accessed Dec. 3, 2013, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy. 
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the United States’ relationships with foreign countries, and thereby improves those 
relationships overall. 
In my concluding section, I provide a few concrete recommendations for how the 
United States can proceed in augmenting its foreign policy system to make it more 
effective. 
B. SCOPE 
To scope this investigation, it is necessary to identify the range of possible cause 
and effect relationships vis-à-vis increases and decreases in foreign policy explicitness. It 
is important to clarify, however, that for the purposes of this thesis a mutually beneficial 
“improvement” in a state-state relationship is necessarily dependent upon the positive-
sum satisfaction of the national interests of the two states in the relationship pair, rather 
than simply the unilateral satisfaction of a single party’s national interests. Scoped as 
such, the following are four possible cause-effect relationships between foreign policy 
explicitness and foreign relations between two states:  
1. An increase of explicitness improves relations 
2. A decrease of explicitness worsens relations 
3.  An increase of explicitness worsens relations 
4. A decrease of explicitness improves relations 
Many real-world examples of each of these situations readily come to mind in 
which one side or the other in state-state relations unilaterally benefitted from a change in 
foreign policy explicitness; however, this thesis focuses on cause-effect relationships in 
which both parties benefit. My entering argument is that only possibility #1 has proven to 
most consistently lead to mutually beneficial results, and possibility #2 has typically led 
to worse relations. Therefore, while it is not my intent to invalidate through omission the 
potential value in exploring possibilities #3 and #4, I focus on possibilities #1 and #2. 
Finally, there are clearly many coherent, well-trod counterarguments to my 
assertions above. Much of realist IR theory is unsupportive of the stabilizing role of trust 
and iterated interactions in the international system, and there is no doubt that secrecy 
plays an important and well-documented role in the conduct of diplomacy. Additionally, 
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there are legitimate concerns that making foreign policy too explicit can constrain a state 
or political party’s freedom to urgently act contrary to its stated policies if the need were 
to arise. I will address these and other concerns in the body of my thesis. It should be 
noted, though, that inherent in the underlying assumptions in this study are the liberal and 
constructivist beliefs that conflict can be avoided if it is proven to be in the best interests 
of both parties;8 the more explicit, quantized, frequent, and productive ideational policy 
interactions are between two states like the U.S. and China, the more likely it is that 
states can find common purpose for cooperation and conflict avoidance.9 While still 
being mindful of the realpolitik forces at work in the world, within reasonable bounds 
and taken in aggregate, in my opinion the act of codifying, updating, and making public 
and transparent the entire body of a state’s foreign policy is inherently stabilizing in the 
world of foreign relations, and is in keeping with the principles upon which both the 
United States’ and China’s representative governance systems are founded. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first fundamental problem I address (Chapter II) is whether the U.S. foreign 
policy system can be modeled using systems engineering principles, and whether such a 
model can provide insight into the role that foreign policy explicitness plays in the 
foreign policy system. In approaching this problem, it is necessary to examine by what 
means foreign policy is crafted and communicated, and in what forms foreign policies are 
received by each counter-party; because of the complexity of the modern U.S. foreign 
policy system, this was not an easy task. The post-2000 foreign policy and diplomacy 
literature attests to this complexity.10 That being said, I hypothesize that by codifying and 
                                                 
8 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 145 (November/December 2004), 30, 
60; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston, MA: McGraw-
Hill, 1993), 42. 
9 On how ideas reduce uncertainty, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Power, 
Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International 
Security 53, no. 3 (Winter) (2000), 10. 
10 For example, see Barry Fulton and Richard Burt and Olin Robison, Reinventing Diplomacy in the 
Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age (Washington, 
DC: CSIS, 1998). Also see Charles Wolf and Brian Rosen, Public Diplomacy: How to Think about and 
Improve it (Washington, DC: RAND, 2004), and see Wilson Dizard, Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign 
Policy in the Information Age (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 
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making explicit individual foreign policies and putting them at the center of their 
respective foreign policy systems,11 states can dramatically improve the efficiency with 
which Trust (T) flows through the overall foreign policy system in an international 
relationship, and thereby also improve the effectiveness of their foreign policies.12 
The second fundamental problem I address (Chapter III) is whether the presence 
of explicit expressions of foreign policy has had a positive effect on U.S.-China foreign 
relations. The rise of China and the appearance of a relative decline in the power of the 
United States has led some IR theorists to assume that, per historical precedent, conflict 
between the two states is inevitable;13 however, diplomatic activity between the two 
states since U.S.-China rapprochement has tended to be conflict-averse, suggesting that 
such a conflict has not been in the national interest of either state up to this point.14 
Future Chinese intentions notwithstanding, foreign relations between the U.S. and China 
have matured effectively over the years to reflect a seemingly implicit desire for non-
violent cooperation. Have explicit foreign policy statements contributed to this stability? I 
hypothesize that from the ashes of a near complete lack of diplomatic communication, the 
U.S. and China have systematically grown a web of explicit foreign policy declarations 
that has led to the higher levels of stability and predictability that both countries enjoy in 
U.S.-China relations today. 
                                                 
11 See Lynn Sandra Kahn, Twenty-First Century Governance: Ten Strategies for Success (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: The Simons Center, 2013), 1, for an excellent explanation of how a systems model of 
governance in which national goals are the framework around which groups cluster to solve problems, and 
the role that metrics play as the feedback mechanism. Also see Robert Litan and Andrew Wyckoff and 
Kaye Husbands Fealing, Capturing Change in Science, Technology, and Innovation: Improving Indicators 
to Inform Policy (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 2013), xiii, for how metrics and indicators 
provide a framework through which decision-makers can make informed decisions. 
12 See Thomas Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command From World War II to Today (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2012), 457, for how Iraqis and Afghans play the U.S. system of rotating generals on 
1-year deployments by slow rolling them and waiting for change, and how one reason why this is possible 
is because there is no consistent policy or strategy framework from which military leaders can operate, 
leading them “reinvent the wheel” on every tour. 
13 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 29. 
14 Adam Lowther et. al., “Chinese-US Relations: Moving Toward Greater Cooperation or Conflict?” 
Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Winter) (2013), 25. 
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The third and final fundamental problem I address (Chapter IV), is whether 
developments in the U.S. foreign policy system reflect a trend away from or toward 
increasing the explicitness U.S. foreign policies. I hypothesize that the increased use of 
the Three Diplomatic Tracks, the revival of the Navy's Foreign Area Officer community, 
and the digital consolidation of foreign policy metrics are indicative of a trend toward 
increasing the explicitness of U.S. foreign policies, and assert that this trend should 
continue in other areas as well. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The creation of a mesh model of foreign policy systems involved a review of 
systems engineering and supply management literatures, as well as consultation with a 
leading systems engineering scholar. 
Building on this work, through an in-depth literature review15 focused on 
discovering examples of either the positive or negative influence of explicitness in 
foreign policies, I examined key inflection points in the relationship between the U.S. and 
China to determine if the explicitness of foreign policy messaging was a causal factor in 
the evolution of U.S.-China relations. 
Finally, I sought out literature describing recent advances in the U.S. foreign 
policy system that appeared germane to the stance that the U.S. takes vis-à-vis the 
explicitness of its foreign policies. 
For my research, I focused primarily on existing literature sources. I did not do 
any fieldwork, interviews, or human subject research outside of discussions with my 
thesis advisors. 
E. IMPORTANCE 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg once said, “In the face of any foreign policy problem, 
our unity is as important as our atom bombs. . . . This is our best available insurance for 
                                                 
15 See Jeffrey Knopf, Doing a Literature Review (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006) 
for an excellent resource on how to conduct a literature review. 
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peace.”16 The unity of the relationship between the U.S. and China has never been more 
important to the stability of the international system. While by almost any measure it is 
clear that this relationship has improved since the 1970s, an analysis of the foreign policy 
systemic factors that led to this improvement can potentially inform future efforts at 
further deepening the productivity of ties between the U.S. and China. 
In 2013, the senior FAO in the Navy’s FAO community, RADM Douglas Venlet, 
expressed a need for the fledgling FAO community to define its purpose17 and improve 
its effectiveness. Measurements of effectiveness (MOE), as they apply to the FAO 
community, are still inadequately defined. Since 2006, the U.S. Navy has realized the 
importance of FAOs at the strategic level of foreign policy execution and 
correspondingly revitalized the community;18 however, the FAO communities of all U.S. 
military forces still struggle to clearly define their importance and why they are in 
increasingly high demand. An improved vision of where FAOs fit into the broader 
context of the foreign policy systemic picture, specifically vis-à-vis relationships with 
countries like China, may help to provide some clarity to the FAO community as it 
moves forward. 
Additionally, my interest in this topic was also motivated by a perceived 
disconnect between how the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) approach the execution of foreign policies.19 A harmonized approach to 
whole-of-government engagement activities like the relationship between the U.S. and 
China, if informed by common U.S. national foreign policies and using agreed-upon 
strategies, operations, and tactics, may help the DOS and DOD act more like the two 
                                                 
16 Cecil Crabb, Glenn Antizzo and Leila Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process: Modes 
of Legislative Behavior (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 81. 
17 Also see Robert Rubel, National Policy and the Post-Systemic Navy (Newport, RI: Naval War 
College Review, 2013), 11 for a call to military organizations to clearly define their strategic purpose in 
order to deserve the resources of society. 
18 Amy Alrich and Joseph Adams and Claudio Biltoc, The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers 
(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013), v. 
19 Francisco Wong-Diaz, Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint 
Special Operations University, 2013), 65. 
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inseparable members of the single nation that they are.20 While this thesis is by no means 
exhaustive, it will have succeeded if it incites discussion or action toward a more holistic, 
systemic approach to how governments think about foreign policy. 
  
                                                 
20 Hillary Clinton, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010), 6. 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
EXPLICITNESS 
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of the society but the 
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to 
exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to 
take it from them, but to inform their discretion. 
—Thomas Jefferson 
in a letter to William Charles Jarvis 
 
In contrast to the traditional qualitative perspective that many people have toward 
foreign policies, a systems engineering perspective on foreign policy analysis is naturally 
focused on the quantitative aspects of the creation, execution, and evaluation processes 
that are integral to a properly functioning foreign policy system. 
As an example of this difference in perspectives, consider the development of the 
printing press and the spread of the printed word. From a qualitative perspective, books 
became a medium for the exchange of ideas. From the systemic perspective, Benedict 
Anderson holds that the advent of the printing press in Europe unified the minds of 
citizens under common national identities through the creation of “unified fields of 
exchange” that increased what he called “fixity.”21 In other words, books became 
modular, fixed nodes around which debates about the concept of nationality could occur. 
Systemically, books increased the explicitness of ideas, made them more prevalent, and 
longer-lasting. 
Further improvements in technology, like the invention of the computer and 
network server, have produced similar systemic effects; however, the power of mass 
inclusion brings with it a new difficulty: finding consensus in an increasingly chaotic, 
inclusive environment. Perhaps more than ever, participants in networks and nations 
around the globe expect to have a say in how they are governed. Rather than rely 
                                                 
21 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Identity in Southeast Asia (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26. 
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completely on blind faith that leaders always adequately represent the will of their 
citizens, laws are institutionalized to establish systemic predictability. Rather than allow 
themselves to be ruled by fiat, citizens now demand that leaders abide by contractual 
agreements in the form of explicit laws, rules, and norms.22 Within this context, from a 
qualitative perspective, governance by representation requires trust on the part of the 
governed. In order to represent trust as a quantitative variable in a systems engineering 
analysis of the processes that drive the foreign policy systems of a representative 
government, I introduce a new variable called Trust (T).23 Just as increasing levels of 
citizen-to-government trust have formed the foundation of modern developed countries, 
increasing the value of T within the foreign policy system increases both the 
effectiveness of the government that represents its citizens and the foreign policies that 
the government is trusted to execute. 
A. FOREIGN POLICIES: WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY LIVE, AND 
HOW THEY WORK 
Foreign policies are complex systems of multiple interacting elements, and exist 
as a subset of the entire range of policies that represent a state's national interest. With the 
understanding that policies are representative of the will of the governed, it is reasonable 
to ask what exactly determines whether a state’s foreign policies can be considered 
effective. There are two parts to this first question. The first has to do with identifying 
                                                 
22 The method by which the interests of the governed are represented in government varies by country, 
but institutionalization of rules-based governance unites all developed countries to varying degrees. For 
example, thus far, Americans tend to prefer multi-party democracy, and the Chinese still find enough 
legitimacy within their single-party meritocracy that they have not overthrown the government. See 
Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002), 39–41 for an 
interesting discussion of the prerequisites for being considered a democracy. Schedler’s “Chain of 
Democratic Choice” chronicles the path and inhibitions to open democracy, from citizens being able to 
choose leaders to being able to live with the results of elections and repeat the election process again. His 
core principles are: 1. Empowerment, 2. Free Supply, 3. Free Demand, 4. Inclusion, 5. Insulation, 6. 
Integrity, and 7. Irreversibility; elections are only democratic if they satisfy all seven of these requirements. 
23 My choice of the word “trust” over others in establishing this variable is based mostly on intuition, 
but there is literature to support the importance of trust as an organizing element of complex bureaucracies. 
Namely, see David Sniffen, The Dynamics and Value of “Trust” in the Military (Small Wars Journal, 
2014), 1 for how trust is the most organic organizing concept that binds together militaries and the citizens 
of the countries they represent. 
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what exactly a foreign policy is, and the second has to do with what exactly 
“effectiveness” is. Both concepts are subject to widespread variety in their use. 
1. What Is a Foreign Policy? 
A foreign policy is a discrete unit of intent that describes an entity's objectives 
with regard to its interactions with other entities.24 A foreign policy could also be 
described as a goal, an ideal, or the characterization of an intended course of action. 
While there is no shortage of academic perspectives on how foreign policies are crafted 
and shaped, rarely does any author directly define what exactly a “foreign policy” is. 
In forming my own definition above, it was helpful to look at a wide variety of 
examples of foreign policies. Diplomacy, for example, is a strategy, not a foreign policy 
per se; diplomacy is merely a subset of the types of activities that are undertaken by state 
representatives in the execution of particular foreign policies. Diplomacy, in and of itself, 
however, also represents a certain kind of foreign policy—that of the intent to use 
diplomatic means to achieve foreign policy objectives. Thus, even in the absence of 
diplomacy—Harold Nicolson holds that diplomacy in its current form didn't really 
emerge until the Italian States started permanently assigning ambassadors to foreign 
countries in the 15th century25—states have always found a wide variety of ways to 
communicate intent to other states. Naturally, sometimes the communication of foreign 
policies can be violent. Carl von Clausewitz clearly defines war as being a political 
instrument that results from the execution of a particular foreign policy, and he defines 
                                                 
24 These entities are most commonly thought of as being states, and indeed this thesis is focused on 
states in this regard, but see George Haynal, Corporate Statecraft (Germany: Transatlantic Academy, 
2013), 14 for how corporations and other entities also have foreign policies. 
25 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963), 26. Also see Henry 
Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 21 and 236 
for how the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, a result of the Thirty Years' War, codified the current system of 
sovereignty and domestic non-interference that we have today. The purpose of the Treaty of Westphalia 
was to separate domestic from foreign policy and to separate the region inside a country from the influence 
of that which might try to come from outside. 
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strategy as the means by which a state intends to execute its foreign policies.26 In 
reference to Chinese foreign policy, Fraser Cameron refers to China's trade-focused 
foreign policies as being a “weapons.”27 In reference to foreign policy communication, 
the invention of the printing press in the 15th century started the systematic processes of 
spreading printed state propaganda to foreign publics.28 Thus, whether through 
diplomacy or war or trade or propaganda, foreign policy can be communicated via a wide 
array of methods. As discrete units of a state's intent, however, foreign policies 
themselves are fairly simple. 
Countless illustrations of foreign policy exist in the world and throughout history, 
but I will provide a few examples here. Rachel Kleinfeld notes that “improving the rule 
of law” in all countries around the world is a common foreign policy goal of many 
Western countries.29 As another example, the Eisenhower administration's Solarium 
Project can be viewed as an attempt by the U.S. to formulate a coherent foreign policy to 
stop the advance of Communism from the Soviet Union.30 Piers Macksey notes that King 
George III’s foreign policy of maintaining all of his empire and colonies was the real 
source of the crown's loss in the U.S. War for Independence.31 President Truman's 
decision to put the 7th Fleet between Formosa and Mainland China in the lead-up to the 
                                                 
26 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88, and John 
Fishel, “Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night,” Frank 
Cass & Co. Ltd. 4, no. 3 (Winter) (1995). Also see Daniel Sukman, Strategic Speed (smallwarsjournal.com: 
Small Wars Journal, 2013), 1, for an interesting look at “strategic speed,” which is defined as how fast the 
upper echelons of government achieve their objectives. 
27 Fraser Cameron, China’s Foreign Policy under the New Leadership – More Continuity than Change 
(Brussels, BE: Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, 2013), 12; see also Jan Melissen and 
Donna Lee and Paul Shard, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations 
(Houndmills, GB: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 89 for China's use of “strategic public diplomacy,” and 
Ibid., 92 for how China hired a world class PR firm called Hill & Knowlton to improve its public image 
after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. 
28 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 3. 
29 Rachel Kleinfeld, How to Advance the Rule of Law Abroad (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2013), 2. 
30 Tyler Nottberg, “Once and Future Policy Planning: Solarium for Today,” The Eisenhower Institute, 
last modified: 2014, last accessed: 2014-03-07, 
http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot. 
31 Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1993), 542. This 
example also shows that when a policy is untenable, no strategy can win. 
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Korean War was also a foreign policy that potentially controlled the spread of 
Communism, but also re-engaged the U.S. in the Chinese civil war.32 When the U.S. 
recalled reservists and deployed carriers after the USS Pueblo was hijacked by North 
Korea in 1968, it was inexplicitly communicating a developing foreign policy toward 
North Korea.33 Even from these simple examples it can be drawn that, fundamentally, a 
good foreign policy decision takes into account the national interest, but must also be 
communicated properly.34 From Henry Kissinger's35 perspective, “the central task of 
American foreign policy is to analyze anew the current international environment and to 
develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable 
order.”36 Similarly, Kenneth Waltz holds that foreign policies are how a state speaks with 
a single voice in order to send clear signals to the outside world.37 So, while it may now 
be clear what a foreign policy is, what makes some foreign policies more effective than 
others? To answer this, it is necessary to examine what exactly the word effectiveness 
means. 
2. Effectiveness in Foreign Policies: Satisfaction of the National Interest 
Foreign policies are goal-oriented systems that seek to satisfy a state’s national 
interests vis-à-vis its external environment. I reviewed academic literature on 
effectiveness in order to better understand how states can determine if their foreign 
                                                 
32 Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of 
Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 33. 
33 Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), 63. 
A valid question, though, is whether the U.S. was demonstrating its intent to be prepare for war, or simply 
revealing a lack of preparation. The inexplicitness of foreign policy messaging can lead to such confusion. 
34 Russ Berkoff, “Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy Decision-Making” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1997), 2. 
35 Of note, I refer many times in this thesis to the works of Henry Kissinger. It is important to note 
that, as in Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), he is sometimes perceived as a controversial historical figure; however, I 
leveraged his work greatly in developing this thesis simply because he is one of the most prolific and astute 
writers on U.S. foreign policy that I have discovered. 
36 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 91. 
37 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), 179. To Waltz, antagonisms in the outside world also provide a forceful feedback 
loop that improves the singularity of this national voice. 
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policies—whether explicitly or implicitly communicated--are effectively accomplishing 
their foreign policy objectives. As it relates to how well states like the U.S. and China 
establish, implement, and alter their foreign policy objectives, “effectiveness” is a 
subjective but important quantity to measure. Unfortunately, effectiveness is also a tricky 
concept. The frustrated tone that pervades the academic literature on effectiveness 
theories is evidence of this. Kim Cameron and David Whetten provide general overviews 
of existing organizational effectiveness theories, and note that because effectiveness is so 
subjective, effectiveness is fundamentally an “unknowable quantity.”38 To paraphrase 
their conclusion, the perfectly effective foreign policy is unknowable because every 
stakeholder in a foreign policy system has a different perspective on what defines 
effectiveness. Tying this to U.S.-China relations, this is akin to the fundamental question 
of whether one should measure the effectiveness of bilateral relations from the 
perspective of the balance of trade, or through the accomplishment of explicitly stated 
U.S. and Chinese foreign policies, or from any of a number of other perspectives. From 
China's perspective, for example, an effective foreign policy is one that allows it to focus 
on “domestic stability and economic growth.”39 From the U.S. perspective, an effective 
foreign policy toward China would bring about improvements in human rights within 
China.40 The theoretical futility of finding nation-wide stakeholder consensus on metrics 
of foreign policy effectiveness has grave implications for those trying to define whether 
the relationship between two states is improving or worsening as a result of particular 
foreign policies. 
Fortunately, a combination of Cameron and Whetten’s “Goal Model”41 and 
systems engineering principles provides a starting place. When viewed as discrete state 
                                                 
38 Kim Cameron and David Whetten, “Organizational Effectiveness and Quality: The Second 
Generation,” Agathon Press 11, no. 1 (1996), 266. 
39 Cameron, China’s Foreign Policy under the New, 13. 
40 Denny Roy, China's Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 95. The U.S. 
claims that its Jackson-Vanik Amendment is a higher authority than the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status, and reserves the right to refuse MFN to any state that does not live up 
to a high human rights bar. 
41 Kim Cameron and David Whetten and et. al, Organizational Effectiveness: A Comparison of 
Multiple Models (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1983), 8. 
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objectives that represent a quorum of the national interest in a representative government, 
individual foreign policies can be understood to be goals that the entire constituency of a 
state is working toward with various levels of coordination and effort. Therefore, the 
efficiency with which a state develops and executes its foreign policies has direct bearing 
upon how effective the foreign policies are. The challenge in quantifying the level of 
effectiveness with which a state is achieving its foreign policy goals, then, is simply a 
matter of applying appropriate metrics to the systemic processes that are engaged in 
developing and executing specific foreign policies. The challenge in doing this, though, is 
that the act of emphasizing some metrics over others is also a subjective judgment that 
requires consensus from the entire constituency of stakeholders as well. A foreign policy 
and its appropriate metrics form a system, and while it is not theoretically impossible to 
gather input from every citizen in a country on every foreign policy and every valid 
measure of effectiveness42 of each foreign policy, it clearly represents a communication 
challenge. Fortunately, thanks to the Internet and social networking, improvements in the 
aggregation of focused citizen communication have been made in recent years.43 
Integrating foreign policies in some way into these more advanced communication 
systems would seemingly provide some promise for improving the measurement of the 
effectiveness of foreign policies. At face value, the digital systemization of foreign 
policies would appear to be a fairly straightforward process that would help improve their 
effectiveness, but states like the U.S. and China have not traditionally structured the 
                                                 
42 See David Goldfein, Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I-14 for a delineation between Measures of Performance 
(MoP) in Civil-Military Operations (CMO) (i.e., tracking how much materiel is supplied, how much 
integration there is) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) (i.e., tracking how much violence is being 
curbed, how well services are being restored, how well the materiel being supplied is actually causing 
positive change). 
43 The study of the dynamic aggregation of metrics, big data, and raw communication is still in its 
infancy, and still highly controversial. See Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, 
Aggregating Governance Indicators (New York, NY: World Bank, 1999), 1 for how, when studying 
complex abstract concepts that have measurable, related components, aggregating those metrics in some 
way can produce broad groupings; though imprecise, such aggregate metrics can be useful in detecting 
trends or generalizations. Also see Ibid., 27 for the caveat that even though aggregation does not produce a 
precise measurement of aggregate indicators, the method of using a “linear unobserved components model” 
to combine indicators represents a systematic and scalable means of creating composite indicators from a 
variety of source data. 
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communication of their foreign policies in such a way as to make the digital transition 
simple. 
3. Dead Trees: Where Foreign Policies Go to Die 
With an understanding of what foreign policies are and what makes them 
effective, it is reasonable to ask where they go after they are decided upon. In the U.S., 
after consensus has been built around specific foreign policies and the president has 
approved them, they are communicated in a variety of ways. Traditionally, foreign 
policies quickly find their final resting places in official hard-copy paper documents that 
provide reference points in the footnotes of other official paper documents, but which 
remain difficult for citizens to quickly find and evaluate for themselves.44 In light of how 
easily citizens can now discover things on the Internet, the historic difficulty of finding 
printed material emblazoned with official U.S. foreign policy may seem quaint, but the 
importance of the mere existence of these documents is difficult to overstate.45 
A key democratic tenet of the League of Nations, survived by its successor 
institution the United Nations (U.N.), was that no treaty could be valid if it were not 
published.46 This was an important development because it finally gave domestic 
audiences the opportunity to read the contracts that their diplomatic emissaries were 
signing them up for and thereafter have a focused domestic debate about specific agreed 
upon line items. The resistance of states to do even this much stems from traditional 
diplomatic practice. Until 1919, it would have been considered of bad faith for a country 
to go against the promises of its diplomats by, upon domestic review of the contents of 
                                                 
44 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 49 for how 
the problem of which level of analysis to examine the world is solved by giving the investigator the choice 
to examine the world at whatever level they choose. In other words, the freedom for all citizens to evaluate 
the foreign policy system at any level of analysis they choose improves the aggregate assessment of 
national security in an anarchical system. 
45 To a certain extent, even the Internet has not made it easier to find U.S. foreign policy. 
46 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 86. 
 19
foreign treaties, refusing to domestically ratify the treaty and turn it into domestic law.47 
In order to avoid international embarrassment, states have a history of hiding their foreign 
policies from the view of their citizens. 
One would hope that time and the improvement of democratic processes would 
have improved this situation and made a definitive collection of official U.S. foreign 
policy easier to find, but this is not the case. While many books on foreign policy 
describe the presidential foreign policy decision-making process or other aspects of the 
foreign policy system, they do not go so far as to describe where or even if to publish 
foreign policies once they have been decided upon. If a U.S. citizen, or a citizen of any 
other country for that matter, wanted to find all U.S. foreign policies toward China, it is 
not clear where they would need to look. Instead of consolidation and clarity, the U.S. 
government often opts to publish broad, national level strategic documents and sprinkle 
frequently-updated foreign policy ideas throughout a dizzying variety of semi-
authoritative sources: the news media, magazine interviews, domestic legislation, 
comments by legislators in obscure party-affiliated blogs, rapid-fire and high-stress 
television (TV) interviews by moderators with a political agenda, tell-all autobiographies, 
Twitter, Facebook, and many others. The ambiguity of official state foreign policies 
leaves the public with little recourse for debate on specific foreign policies.48 Thus, the 
stubborn refusal by most, if not all governments, to consolidate their foreign policy into a 
single coherent and authoritative living document49 is intriguing; perhaps states perceive 
some logic in choosing ambiguity over explicitness. 
There is good reason to believe that codifying foreign policies will make them 
more difficult to change. Policies in complex decision-making environments become 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 87. Also see Michael John Garcia, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. 
Law, CRS Report RL32528 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014) for a useful 
summary of the difference between self-executing international agreements and non-self-executing ones. 
Self-Executing international agreements have the force of law in the U.S. without the need for Congress to 
enact further domestic implementing legislation. 
48 George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign, xiv. 
49 See Catherine Dale, National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for 
Congress, CRS Report R43174 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 20 for how the 
current means of publishing U.S. strategic guidance is no longer fast enough to keep up with the real world. 
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difficult to change once they are decided upon, because the pain of the formalization 
process can lead policy-makers to dread the idea of making changes.50 This is not an 
unattractive explanation; however, in the same breath as he mentioned the previous 
sentence, Henry Kissinger also asserts that foreign policy speeches function as an 
inflection point that marks the end of internal government debate and allows government 
to move on to new issues because public statements cannot be taken back.51 For both the 
merits of citizen oversight and government focus, there is value in fixing foreign policies 
in place. The Chinese government has come to similar conclusions. 
Even a governing body like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), commonly 
perceived to be part of a closed and non-democratic system, understands the importance 
of updating and broadcasting changes to government policies. The Chinese government 
broadcasts its policies via websites, white papers, magazines, and Track Two academic 
fora.52 The State Council Information Office, China's official mouthpiece, uses white 
papers to make its policies and practices explicitly known to both foreign and domestic 
audiences;53 under Zhao Qizheng's leadership, China worked diligently to “explain 
China's official positions and policies on issues more fully to foreigners.”54 From the 
outside looking in, though, it is not clear where U.S. citizens should look to find all 
Chinese foreign policy positions toward the U.S. It would seem that such explicitness 
would be helpful in both understanding what China's foreign policies are, and evaluating 
how well China abides by them. 
At this point it is important to confirm that the simple act of publishing foreign 
policies is not enough to get states or their citizens to abide by them; however, it is also 
important to realize that foreign policies are guideposts by which to evaluate a state's 
foreign policy execution. As Henry Kissinger so eloquently put it, “(t)o set forth 
                                                 
50 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 20. 
51 Ibid., 23. 
52 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 93. 
53 Ibid., 98. 
54 Ibid., 99. He used a computer during a presentation to show how the information in the Cox Report 
that accused China of stealing secrets could all be freely found on the Internet by anyone. 
 21
principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But 
they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.”55 Properly 
published foreign policies do more than simply inform the public of the reasoning behind 
a government's actions abroad; they allow people to confirm that governments are 
following their own foreign policies. Governments have a long way to go in order to 
transition from the old, disaggregated ways of communicating foreign policy toward the 
benefits of a more consolidated system that allows all the elements of the foreign policy 
system to interact in more efficient, and therefore effective, ways. Rather than searching 
blindly for potential efficiencies in the foreign policy system, though, it is important to 
examine the basic elements that comprise the system first. 
4. The Foreign Policy Network: A System of Elements 
The content of foreign policies is influenced by a wide variety of both domestic 
and international actors, but foreign policies have at their foundation the support of the 
citizens whose interests the foreign policies represent. The content of foreign policies is 
influenced by the opinions of a wide variety of sources, including media, political parties, 
interest groups, and others,56 and their quality is increased through public discourse.57 
From an overall systemic perspective, foreign policies are developed domestically by 
national leaders taking into consideration external, societal, governmental, financial, and 
personal factors, and are modified based on detectable reactions to the implementation of 
those policies.58 
a. The Role of the People: The Supply Source 
The consent of the governed is the primary source of legitimacy and Trust (T) in 
any foreign policy system. All the steps between the citizen consensus-finding stage and 
the execution stage in the foreign policy system are a degradation of T in the system. 
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While there is certainly a history of state leaders successfully acting unilaterally in the 
interest of their citizens, such actions fundamentally represent a departure from the ideal 
state of governed systems in which the legitimacy of leaders is dependent upon the 
continued perception of legitimacy on the part of their citizens. Indeed, legitimacy is 
appropriately a chief concern of many countries.59 Of significant interest, then, is whether 
citizens of any given country are an engaged, informed, and participative element in the 
creation of foreign policies. 
In the United States in particular, the American people have historically not been 
particularly concerned about foreign policy, but this does not indicate an abdication of 
their right to be the final arbiter of the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy decisions. It was 
only after World War I (WWI) that American citizens first became keenly interested in 
foreign diplomacy and foreign policy, a result of the public beginning to perceive the 
effects that a state's foreign policy decisions and agreements with foreign powers could 
have on local circumstances.60 WWI marked a turning point in American wars because 
war was no longer solely the realm of soldiers; the American public “realized that a 
country might be committed (without its full knowledge, deliberation and approval) to 
policies involving definite pledges to foreign Powers,” which began to tax upon every 
citizen.61 This interest in foreign policies on the part of the American people only 
increased when body bags started coming back from Korea and Vietnam. Where the 
American public had previously been apathetic toward foreign policy, it took a large 
deviation from the public interest to bring foreign policy into the forefront of public 
discourse62 and highlight the dangers of opaque foreign policies. When foreign policies 
are not even transparent to American citizens, the public (and sometimes even the 
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Congress) has no basis by which to evaluate foreign actions, and this has proven capable 
of threatening the legitimacy of the government acting on their behalf.63 American 
citizens are the sole legitimate source of American foreign policy, and America as a 
whole is better off when its leaders are constrained by public opinion.64 Naturally, there 
are reasonable counter-arguments to this point. 
Though leaders may sometimes like to think that the foreign policy issues they 
deal with are beyond the comprehension of their citizens, the complexities of the modern 
world have endangered the ability of any limited cabal of individuals to make effective 
foreign policy decisions.65 It is certainly true that, in an electoral democracy, the public 
implicitly cedes some of its decision-making authority to its elected leaders,66 but global 
systems are becoming increasingly complex, beyond the point where individual leaders in 
isolation can expect to make coherent decisions about the full range of issues they face. A 
small adjustment in the policy of a single actor within a global geopolitical system can 
produce outcomes of untold magnitude.67 Accordingly, since the global system is too 
complex to be entrusted to decision-making by the intuition of individual leaders, foreign 
policy decision-making should be institutionalized and spread out amongst a team of 
actors.68 While allowing the public to deliberate directly on foreign policy issues would 
at first seem to be overly disaggregated and difficult to focus, complex systems have a 
way of self-organizing;69 fundamentally, there is good reason to believe that the inclusion 
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of a variety of ideas and public debate improves the ultimate outcomes of decisions, and 
the accountability of results,70 and the absence of public debate leads to “inferior” foreign 
policies being implemented.71 For better or for worse, from a foreign policy systemic 
perspective, the primary source of foreign policy legitimacy lies within the consent of the 
governed, and the starting value of T in the foreign policy system is based on the quality 
and cohesiveness of citizen input into the foreign policy system. To determine whether 
the public opinion on particular foreign policies is a well-informed one, one must 
examine the sources of information upon which the people are basing their opinions.72 
b. The Role of the Media: A Lens and Conduit 
The media provides information and a sense of focus to the public that helps 
citizens form opinions about the shaping and execution of foreign policies that the media 
considers to be worth “air time.” As a moniker used to describe the media, the phrase 
“fourth estate” came about during the French Revolution when the press became an 
important factor in managing public opinion.73 The relationship between the media and 
the government that executes foreign policies can be quite complicated. In the Roosevelt 
administration, Secretary State Cordell Hull's daily meeting with the press was the only 
avenue through which the public was made aware of U.S. foreign policy developments.74 
Growing from there, the increasing speed and reach of the media has had both negative 
and positive foreign policy impacts. For example, the secret U.S. plan to invade the Bay 
of Pigs likely failed because the plans for the operation were leaked to the press and made 
public.75 On the other hand, Warren Strobel notes that U.S. leaders use American news 
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media to communicate messages to foreign leaders when other lines of communication 
may be cut off.76 For example, Madeleine Albright used the media to convey her foreign 
policies during the U.S. response to the massacres in Sarajevo.77 The media, therefore, 
can be both a useful and a harmful tool for providing information and educating the 
public, but at times can also be slave to political agendas that influence the media's 
narrative. 
Neither the U.S. nor China has a media that is completely outside the influence of 
political agendas. In an ideal world, Robert Entman asserts that the modern media should 
work to fill in the perceived gaps of government policy.78 In America, where the media is 
largely understood to have free rein to report on anything, Entman notes that because 
elites can manipulate polling data, it is not enough for polling data to mirror government 
policy because he is pessimistic that a news media can be crafted that is completely 
outside the control of government elites.79 This problem is also particularly acute in 
China. For example, satellite dishes were first allowed into China during Nixon's visit in 
1972 in order for China to show a favorable face to the world.80 After Nixon left China, 
though, China then purchased those satellite dishes and used them to control access to 
international information sources.81 The difference in how America and China approach 
the media is reflected in the states' different views of how the media fits into the foreign 
policy system. Whereas the pluralist view holds that the media aggregates public opinion 
and plays a checking role against government, the elitist view holds that the media is just 
a mouthpiece for the political elite.82 Either way, the end result is a public that is either 
fully informed, or informed in ways that are shaped by those in charge of the media, 
based on the content, issues, and perspectives that are given “air time.” From a systemic 
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perspective, when the media is used to communicate foreign policy, it introduces varying 
amounts of bias that obscure the public's view of a state's real foreign policies. A system 
that corrects for this bias by allowing the public to interact directly with the shaping of 
the full spectrum of their state's foreign policies would help to remove this distorting 
factor83 and increase T within the foreign policy system as a whole. 
c. The Role of Political Parties: Shaping Focus 
As institutions that consolidate ideological perspectives for the convenience of the 
citizens in representative governments, political parties shape foreign policies through the 
simple act of consolidating public opinion.84 In the 1890s, the U.S. was somewhat unique 
in that its foreign policies were often clearly being influenced by domestic politics.85 
Over the course of the century since then, this influence has only increased, and the 
extent to which foreign policy decisions are purely representative of the national interest 
is debatable. In determining whether public opinion has an effect on the issues political 
parties focus on, Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay tried to determine whether political elites 
are properly interpreting public opinion. Not only did they find that political elites 
misperceive public opinion frequently,86 but they found that politicians rarely poll on 
foreign policy-related issues because foreign policy “doesn't win elections.”87 
Additionally, they discovered that politicians' perceptions of public opinion tend to be 
formed by the vocal majority, rather than a fully representative majority of their 
constituents.88 Thus, unfortunately, when it comes to foreign policy, politics no longer 
stops “at the water's edge.”89 To the extent that they define the overall makeup of the 
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Legislative Branch of the U.S. government, political parties shape, and at times distort, 
the range of foreign policy issues that are eventually debated and legislated upon by the 
Congress. Because political parties introduce a bias into the foreign policy system, 
allowing citizens to bypass them and participate more directly in shaping a more non-
partisan foreign policy may help to increase T and thereby improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the foreign policy system overall. 
d. The Role of the Congress: Legislating and Balancing the Executive 
The U.S. Congress fulfills two primary functions in the foreign policy system: 1. 
formally codifying into Legislation the ground rules by which U.S. foreign policy is 
executed, and 2. as a proxy for the constituents the members of Congress represent, 
ensuring that the Executive Branch's actions in executing foreign policies are in line with 
U.S. national interests. Before George Washington took office in 1789, Congress was the 
only foreign policy decision-making body in the U.S.90 Over time, as the Executive 
Branch has taken over most of that role, the U.S. Congress has, appropriately, continued 
to demand a say in foreign policy;91 however, its tools are limited. For example, the 
Congress controls the budget that the Executive Branch can bring to bear on the 
execution of foreign policies.92 Congress can also use domestic legislation to both try to 
influence foreign countries,93 and strengthen the national resolve behind foreign policies, 
as was seen in the Taiwan Relations Act.94 Congress has also been known to variously 
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use its powers of oversight and confirmation to influence foreign policy as well.95 While 
Congressional members may be acting on behalf of the American people with the tools 
they have available,96 they are not necessarily in a position of power over the president 
and the Executive Branch. 
Once the Executive Office of the President has set its mind on a particular foreign 
policy, there is little evidence to show that the Congress can do anything to change it.97 
Since its founding, the Congress has typically rolled over and acquiesced to strong 
Executive Branch foreign policy positions. A few examples can be found in the Louisiana 
Purchase under President Jefferson, the Panama Canal under President Theodore 
Roosevelt, the Lend-Lease program under Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), and the Vietnam 
War under multiple presidents.98 There are good reasons why the president is given such 
executive authority, and why the Congress is generally powerless to intervene. Through 
an analysis of case history, Paul Peterson notes that the Congress has de facto acquiesced 
to the predominance of executive discretion as it relates to foreign policy crafting and 
execution.99 He also asserts that because the anarchical nature of the international system 
likely limits the choices available to the U.S., the president’s judgment is given priority 
over Congress’ because of the Executive Branch’s ability to operate in secret, and do so 
with vigor and without hesitation.100 Congressional power over the implementation of 
foreign policy is also curtailed by the ambiguity of legislation like the War Powers 
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Resolution, which gives the president considerable leeway in deciding how to interpret 
his War Powers.101 Finally, Congress has never proven it has the ability to decisively 
deter the Executive branch from pursuing a foreign policy it really wants to pursue,102 
and the American public is not supportive of greater Legislative Branch foreign policy 
decision-making influence either.103 In sum, the Congress can be helpful in that it 
increases the explicitness of foreign policies through formal legislation, but for the most 
part it remains a hapless institution in terms of representing the full array of its 
constituents' interests in an unbiased way, and in terms of its inability to influence the 
execution of specific foreign policies. A more streamlined system that allows the full 
array of Congress’s constituents (the American people) to consolidate their opinions 
aligned along specific, explicit foreign policies would help make it a less biased, stronger, 
more effective institution and increase T within the foreign policy system. 
e. The Role of the President: The Nexus of Supply and Execution 
As leader of the Executive Branch of the U.S. government, the president is at the 
nexus between the supply side of the foreign policy system and the execution side. Being 
at the center of this nexus, the president is accordingly embroiled in a balancing act 
between domestic politics and the powers and responsibilities associated with the 
execution of foreign policies.104 The domestic political conflict inherent in the U.S. 
foreign policy-making system is defined by the Constitution’s “invitation to struggle;” 
since its inception, the U.S. has continuously reaffirmed that no single power in 
government should be given sole authority over decision-making.105 Accordingly, 
political dissent over foreign policies can be found as far back as the “War Hawks” and 
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their unity around particular policies in the lead up to the War of 1812.106 Taking 
advantage of fundamental disagreements about war powers existed between presidents 
Jefferson and Madison and the Congress, the War Hawks were able to steamroll two 
pacifist presidents into war.107 Managing this potential for chaos and presenting a united 
foreign policy front to the world is the president's job, and is at times more or less 
cooperative. The Marshall Plan is heralded as an example of successful and substantive 
collaboration between the Legislative and Executive branch on foreign policy. Indeed, for 
Truman, the program was too big to leave Congress out of the conversation.108 Yet, 
modern foreign policy distrust between the Executive and Legislative branches was sown 
after the President may have misled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the 
results of his actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965.109 Thus, while both Congress 
and the president are elected members of government, the issue of which side is truly 
representing the national interest is at question.110 
Presidents have significant unilateral power to decide upon and execute foreign 
policies. This can sometimes create conflict between the president, Congress, and the 
                                                 
106 Crabb, Congress and the Foreign, 27. Also see Wittkopf, The Domestic Sources of American, 155 
for how the U.S. Congress decided to go to war from 1789 to 1950, but all wars since have seen the 
President leading the battle cry. 
107 Crabb, Congress and the Foreign, 28. Also see Ibid., 27 for how Congress held the war debate in 
secret from anti-war naysayers, and were able to quickly push a war decision through, and Ibid., 29 for how 
Congressmen sowed dissent and confusion about U.S. foreign policy while on diplomatic mission in 
Britain. 
108 Crabb, Congress and the Foreign, 96. 
109 Wilcox, The Constitution and the Conduct, v. 
110 See Wittkopf, The Domestic Sources of American, 23 and Ibid., 122 for the question of whether 
elections influence both the timing and substance of foreign policy changes. Miroslav Nincic contends that 
Presidents and presidential candidates often take elections into account when crafting foreign policies. 
 31
American public.111 In terms of how presidents approach the consolidation of issue-
specific foreign policies, Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs group U.S. presidents into 
those that “lead” public opinion, and those that “follow” it. They classify most presidents 
from Truman to Clinton as “leaders,”112 but it is only since President Roosevelt's 
administration that this has been the case.113 The Legislative-Executive disagreement 
over the threat imposed by the Axis powers in World War II (WWII) is the classic 
example of a situation where the president's leadership cut through a foggy political 
situation and avoided what might have been a tragic end to WWII.114 As opposed to 
Congress, the president has so much real-time responsibility for the well-being of the 
nation that it would be irresponsible to follow radical movements in popular opinion 
amongst factions in the Legislature.115 That being said, Melvin Small highlighted the 
dangers of an Executive Branch that “leads” more than it “follows” when he said, 
“Acheson and Kissinger may have committed more blunders when they tried to operate 
secretly and in an undemocratic fashion than when they produced programs that were 
influenced by and acceptable to the wide variety of often insular groups outside the state 
Department, the Oval Office, and the National Security Council.”116 Thus, while at a 
certain point the president must make decisions a timely manner, the foreign policy 
decision-making process should most certainly take into account the opinions of 
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Congress and the American public.117 Deciding whether a predominance of leadership or 
followership is called for makes the president's job the most difficult in the foreign policy 
system. 
Fortunately, in times of need, the president has the power of the bully pulpit, and 
there are few places where foreign policies are made more explicit than on camera in 
front of the world. Just as Deng Xiaopeng’s “open-door policy” was all the invitation that 
some people needed to start interacting with China,118 the finality of the president's word 
can be effectively used to communicate foreign policy and consolidate public opinion. 
Indeed, radio and television, and now computers, have made it a lot easier for presidents 
to bypass normal policy filtering channels by addressing the public directly.119 Provided 
the power is not abused, increasing the president's direct access to the people is a good 
thing. In sum, the President is a critical and irreplaceable nexus between the supply side 
of the foreign policy system, and its executive side. Any improvements that streamline 
the process by which the President's specific foreign policies get to the American people 
and the rest of his Executive Branch in a more pure and unadulterated way increases T 
within the foreign policy system as a whole. 
f. The Role of the DOS and DOD: Foreign Executors 
After public consensus is transformed and codified into foreign policy executive 
instructions, two departments of the Executive Branch take the lead on executing U.S. 
foreign policy: the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). 
Though seemingly straightforward on the surface, this statement is overly simplistic and 
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not without controversy.120 On paper, the Secretary of State is president's principal 
foreign policy advisor.121 In practice, though, it is the U.S. National Security Council 
(NSC) as a unit that must find consensus on foreign policy direction and function as the 
highest foreign policy-making body in the U.S. government.122 The NSC, established in 
1947 in order to coordinate the activities of the DOD and DOS, began what turned out to 
be a long-standing tradition of boiling down long-winded DOS memorandums into bullet 
points and sending both documents up to the president for review; naturally, the shorter 
reports were more likely to be read by the president and influence actual policy 
direction.123 To limit the potential for conflict that might arise from this situation, 
agreement between the DOS and DOD on foreign policy issues often occurs at the Joint 
Staff level, the primary Joint military office subordinate to the Office of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.124 Typically, conflicts that arise have to do with a difference of 
opinions about the pace and content of foreign policy responses to external indicators. 
Whereas the State Department generally tries to slow the development of issues down 
and allow situations to cool off in order to avoid conflict, the instant foreign policy 
response that the military can offer is attractive to political leaders that demand solutions 
immediately.125 In theory, the primary document that serves to unify the foreign policies 
that provide direction to both the DOS and the DOD is the president's National Security 
Strategy (NSS).126 In practice, however, a lot more could be done to make the President's 
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top-level foreign policies more explicit and useful as foundational guidance to the 
strategies, operations, and tactics for which the president's foreign policies provide 
justification.127 Foreign partners would also find such explicit guidance equally 
helpful.128 Any systemic improvements that make the U.S. government's foreign policy-
related actions more transparent and predictable, less threatening, and easier to cooperate 
with along the full spectrum of strategies, operations, and tactics can lead to an increase 
in T within the foreign policy system as a whole.129 
g. The Role of Foreign Entities: Feedback Mechanisms for Global 
Effectiveness 
Whereas U.S. citizens provide the primary source of national foreign policy 
consensus and Trust (T) that legitimizes the foreign policies the president authorizes, 
actors in foreign countries provide an important feedback mechanism that helps the U.S. 
adjust its policies to be more effective within the international community. The opinions 
and needs of citizens of foreign countries now matter more to the U.S. and other nations 
than was thought possible just 25-30 years ago, and the shape of interactions between 
states has changed accordingly.130 This transition took a while to take root. World War I 
heralded the beginnings of the concept of “power over opinion,” which in turn was the 
                                                 
127 There is no shortage of think-tank studies on how to better structure the U.S. military planning 
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128 See Curtis Scaparrotti, Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations (Washington, DC: United 
States Government, 2013), I-4 for how publicly available U.S. joint military guidance can help multi-
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130 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, xvii. 
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precursor to Joseph Nye's concept of “soft power.”131 The bifurcation between traditional 
diplomacy, with its focus on connections between state leaders, and public diplomacy, 
with its focus on establishing state-to-state connections directly between citizens, is 
symbolic of this new focus on soft power.132 Whereas traditional hard power, in the form 
of warships and nuclear bombs, brought an end to WWII, the goal of soft power is to 
allow states to resolve policy differences prior to the onset of physical hostilities. While 
soft power remains a controversial idea amongst international relations scholars, a key 
component to the effective execution of soft power foreign policies is the explicit 
communication of foreign policies to foreign actors. In return, the feedback received from 
foreign actors is indicative of their receptiveness to such policies. The Internet has helped 
speed up this feedback loop. 
The creation and growth of the Internet has been integral to the reduction of the 
costs of citizen-to-citizen interaction; the new public diplomacy emerging between 
mature states because of this has transformed diplomacy from a one-way propaganda 
information dissemination program into more of an engagement in active dialogue with 
foreign publics.133 Not every country is keen on this reduction in sovereign control over 
the hearts and minds of their citizens. Both China and Russia have expressed concern 
over the lack of ideological content control on the Internet. As a means of U.S. foreign 
policy transmission, the Internet has also facilitated the slow merger of the field of public 
diplomacy with the field of public relations, in that the primary focus of both fields is 
now the facilitation of the exchange of information between domestic and foreign 
entities.134 The increased focus on this type of public diplomacy is in many ways a 
response to the increasing political power and leverage of individuals and small groups 
not only in the U.S., but in many other countries as well.135 As nice as this may sound, 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 4. 
132 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 5. Also see United States Department of State, Public 
Diplomacy for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 1999) for a DOS 
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133 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 13. 
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there are risks in tying public diplomacy too intimately to domestic foreign policy 
processes; by subjecting the target audience too intimately to the vicissitudes of U.S. 
domestic politics, public diplomacy risks alienating foreign publics. Public diplomacy 
should be treated first and foremost as an information feedback loop and self-adjustment 
tool, not as a tactic for injecting foreign policy vectors.136 
The importance of creating foreign policy feedback loops with foreign entities can 
also be seen in the public diplomacy failures of China. The lack of consideration for a 
foreign public's perception of a state's actions can lead to what some advertisers might 
call an “image problem.” Strobe Talbott argues that globalization is leading to the “end of 
foreign policy,” in that every action a state takes abroad eventually echoes back into the 
domestic environment.137 This feedback loop has led many countries to fall in line with 
international norms in order to participate in the benefits of globalization,138 but countries 
like China that lack such feedback loops are unable to develop the domestic momentum 
to create such change. As a direct result of its unwillingness to open its domestic 
environment to full-scale private actor involvement in its foreign policy system, and its 
refusal to allow feedback from foreign entities to influence Chinese foreign policies, 
China is only comfortable conducting public diplomacy at the state-to-state, strategic 
level.139 Also, because it creates a more controlled feedback loop, China prefers to target 
specific foreign policy messages to specific regions of the world, shunning the word 
“diplomacy” for a more preferable description of its activities as “external publicity.”140 
This is not to say that China is incapable of soft power, though. Indeed, China has proven 
highly effective at economic diplomacy in Africa, South America, and other regions.141  
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137 Wittkopf, The Domestic Sources of American, 204. 
138 Ibid., 206. 
139 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 89. 
140 Ibid., 98. 
141 For China's economic activities in Africa, see Marc Lanteigne, Moving Beyond Asia: China's 
Cross-Regional Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2008), 136; For South America, Pieter Bottelier, 
“China, the Financial Crisis, and Sino-American Relations,” Asia Policy no. 9 (2010). 
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What China's reluctance to open its foreign policies to increased explicitness and foreign 
actor feedback does represent, however, is how the interconnectedness of the 
international system as a whole constrains policy choices.142 States do not typically abide 
losing freedom of action, but it is increasingly necessary in order to participate in the 
international system. No state can exist in isolation in the world anymore, and the better a 
state can align its foreign policies to build shared prosperity within the international 
system, the higher the value of T will be after it makes its return trip from abroad in the 
foreign policy system. 
h. The Role of Secrets: Explicitly, Behind Closed Doors 
While a key theme of this thesis is the importance of increasing the quantity and 
explicitness of public expressions of a state's foreign policy, there is still an important 
role for the secret communication of explicit foreign policies via non-transparent 
diplomatic channels. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville disparaged the inability of 
democracies to skillfully develop and execute foreign policies; democracies, he noted, 
lack prudence, patience, and the ability to keep secrets, all of which foreign affairs 
sometimes requires.143 In this point, he clearly expressed a dilemma that still persists in 
the creation and execution of foreign policies: the need for openness in the creation of 
foreign policies, and some measure of secrecy and professionalism in their execution.144 
Until 1918, many monarchs fancied themselves to be their own best foreign diplomat.145 
In response to such an old-fashioned perspective, to which Klemens von Metternich 
might have agreed that it is dangerous for the public to have knowledge of foreign policy, 
                                                 
142 Robert Axelrod, Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, NJ: 
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143 Small, Democracy & Diplomacy, xi. 
144 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 12. See Ibid., 246 for how foreign policy should never be secret to a 
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George Canning posits that public opinion can be a tool more powerful than armies.146 In 
practice, both opinions have a role to play. There are many circumstances in which the 
content of negotiations that lead to the establishment of consensus over foreign policies 
should remain confidential.147 That being said, even though there is definitely a case for 
treaties to be negotiated behind closed doors, those the doors should be opened wide once 
consensus transforms into a mutually agreeable treaty.148 Secrecy can have both positive 
and negative effects on T in the foreign policy system. 
i. The Role of Node Connections in the Foreign Policy System: 
Degradation of Intent 
The final element of the foreign policy system that I explored in depth is one 
which has little academic literature from which to draw vis-à-vis the foreign policy 
system, but which has great detrimental impact on the foreign policy system as a whole: 
the connections between elemental nodes in the foreign policy system. Conceptually, the 
existence of these node connections is obvious once they are pointed out, but their effects 
can be hidden and quite heinous. Each nodal element in the foreign policy system needs 
to be able to communicate with other nodes in some way. For example, in non-dictatorial, 
representative governments, citizens communicate with their representative leaders in a 
variety of ways: through votes in democratic elections, political demonstrations in the 
streets, non-violent resistance, letter-writing, et cetera. Government representatives like 
the President of the United States then decide upon foreign policies that satisfy the 
balance of domestic and foreign demand signals, and then publish those foreign policies 
for action to their subordinates. Those subordinates, in turn, create bureaucratic 
administrative and operational structures that can translate the President's foreign policies 
into the subordinate, detailed instructions required to satisfactorily execute the President's 
                                                 
146 Ibid., 73. 
147 Thomas Bailey, The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience (New York, NY: Appleton-
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stated foreign policy objectives. While each step in this process sounds reasonable to 
those that are accustomed to such a hierarchical system, each method of communication 
contains some measure of inefficiency at transmitting the foreign policy intent of the 
governed to those that are executing the operations and tactics at the pointy end of the 
foreign policy system (i.e., DOS Foreign Service Officers, or DOD Foreign Area 
Officers). Anyone that has ever played the game “telephone” with 15 elementary school 
first graders knows how quickly a message can degrade when it passes through multiple 
nodes in such a communication system.149 This degradation can be improved in two 
ways: 1. reduce the number of nodes between the first and the last student, and 2. allow 
the students to write the message down. While most great powers are better at 
communicating amongst themselves than first graders, where inefficiencies exist there is 
always room for improvement. 
Fundamentally, the problem of optimizing the communication of foreign policies 
between nodes in the foreign policy system has to do with the transformation of tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge. Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi explore the 
optimization of the knowledge transfer process in great detail in their 1995 book “The 
Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of 
Innovation.” The authors argue that Japanese companies have historically succeeded 
because they have good organizational knowledge creation processes and are good at 
sharing knowledge internally.150 They define two types of knowledge: 
1. Explicit Knowledge: that knowledge which is articulated in formal language 
and can be shared between individuals easily151 
                                                 
149 In the game “telephone,” an initial (somewhat complex) statement is given to the person at the 
front of a line of participants and is instructed to memorize the statement they heard, word-for-word, and 
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2. Tacit Knowledge: intangible experience, beliefs, and perspectives that are 
difficult to codify152 
From within knowledge-creating systems, they argue, new knowledge is always 
created by the individual,153 and is matured and made more explicit by group feedback 
mechanisms.154 The resulting knowledge creation feedback loop improves the 
explicitness of the shared ideas, the strength of the consensus built around them,155 and 
the ability for individual actors to pursue their functional goals autonomously within the 
autopoietic system, yet within the functional boundaries defined by the larger system.156 
The authors go so far as to find corollaries to this autopoietic system in the U.S. military; 
they note how the U.S. military is bureaucratic in peacetime but function-oriented 
through task forces in wartime.157 Bureaucratic organizational structures work fine when 
conditions are stable, but task forces function well in dynamic situations.158 The key to 
the success of function-oriented task forces is their ability to operate autonomously based 
on simple, explicit instructions before a situation occurs. By making their policies clear in 
the form of a set of explicit orders, a commander enables their subordinates to act freely 
within certain constraints. 
This concept of improving the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge so as to enable more nodes in the system to act autonomously is fundamental 
to the improvement of the transfer of foreign policies between nodes in the foreign policy 
system. In order for all nodes in the foreign policy system to act in concert, foreign 
policies must be made explicit. Also, by making foreign policies explicit, all nodes in the 
system can interact with foreign policies more directly, removing the distortional effects 
of intermediary nodes that get between citizens and their foreign policy executive agents. 
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The net effect of improving the quality of node connections and reducing the quantity of 
required nodes between foreign policy decision and foreign policy action is to increase 
the amount of T present in the foreign policy system at the point of execution. 
j. The Elements in Summary: A System of Communicating Nodes 
If states focus on identifying, publishing openly, and fine-tuning the full spectrum 
of foreign policies that guide their actions, they can dramatically improve the 
effectiveness of the execution of their foreign policies. Each of the elements of the 
foreign policy system described in depth above plays a key role in the successful 
functioning of the system as a whole, but each element can only perform as well as the 
nodes can communicate with each other. In order to improve the efficiency of the foreign 
policy system and thereby improve its effectiveness, hierarchical control over foreign 
policy decision-making should be replaced by “distributed decision-making, delegated 
authority, and bureaucratic streamlining.”159 Improving the efficiency with which all 
nodes in the foreign policy system can act in harmonic execution of common foreign 
policies also opens up the system to safe, focused, and effective participation by a wider 
variety of well-intentioned stakeholders, like NGOs, businesses, international 
organizations, and individual citizens.160 When each of those actors helps to carry foreign 
policy messages and action to foreign entities, the amount of T brought to bear in the 
execution of foreign policies is increased. The pitfalls of not doing so are clear. In China, 
Hainan Province unilaterally issued controversial passports that contained a graphic that 
explicitly showed Chinese claims to the South China Sea; the national government 
moved quickly to withdraw them.161 In the U.S., after China announced its East China 
Sea (ECS) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in late 2013, the apparent 
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contradiction between the initial responses of the DOS and DOD,162 and that of the U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) required amplifying remarks to smooth over 
confusion on the part of Japan and others. Both of these mistakes could have been 
avoided. Large, complex systems need both efficient and accurate methods of 
communication.163 With the overall structure of the foreign policy system thus defined at 
great length in this subsection, I will now consolidate them into a generalized flow 
structure. 
5. Section Conclusion: Trusted Emissaries, Effective Foreign Policies 
With all of the elements of the foreign policy system described in depth above, in 
the rest of this chapter I will model the U.S. foreign policy system as it exists today, and 
then streamline that model with a supply chain analysis by discovering systemic 
inefficiencies. 
B. CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM FLOW MODEL: HIGH LOSS 
OF T THROUGH FILTERS 
Though it contains the inefficiencies described above, there is a definable path 
from U.S. citizens to the boots and wingtips on the ground executing U.S. foreign policy. 
What follows is a step-by-step systemic flow walkthrough of a single U.S. foreign policy. 
The focus of this flow analysis is to determine where Trust (T) is lost as it flows through 
the system. 
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1. Step 1 (Node): U.S. Citizens (T-Max) 
As stakeholders in the success of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. citizens build up 
legitimacy for foreign policies in a variety of ways: voting, tweeting, protesting, writing 
their Congressmen, lobbying, complaining on national TV, etc. The end result of this 
back-and-forth debate with leaders is either a strong enough consensus on foreign 
policies to keep those leaders in office, the failure of those leaders in the following 
election, or the forcible impeachment of those leaders.164 Here, T is at its maximum 
value. 
2. Step 1.5 (Connection): Filtered Connections to Leaders (T-Loss) 
Based on the medium that citizens use to transmit foreign policy opinions to their 
leaders, there is significant loss in the transmission of citizen intent to their leaders. The 
translation of citizen demands into their corresponding national foreign policy 
equivalents is currently an imprecise process because citizens en masse have no way to 
target their messaging at in-common, specific, explicitly defined foreign policies. 
Congressional lobbyists are better at targeting their messages because they understand the 
inner workings of how policies can be influenced. 
3. Step 2 (Node): National Leadership (T-Loss) 
Both the Congress and the president try their best to listen to the American public, 
but at times the messages they receive are filtered through their own political biases and 
agendas. The foreign policies that get turned into reality may or may not be exactly 
representative of the national consensus, no matter how good political polling may be. A 
T-Loss occurs here, due to the personal biases of national leaders themselves. 
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4. Step 2.5 (Connection): Filtered Policies and Disaggregated Guidance 
(T-Loss) 
National leadership does their best to codify U.S. foreign policy in a variety of 
ways: acts of Congress, public statements to the media, broad and sweeping national 
policy documents that provide guidance to Executive Department forces, et cetera. Taken 
as a whole, this disaggregated guidance serves as the full body of U.S. foreign policy, but 
it is likely impossible for anyone to keep track of it all or reference it to assure 
themselves and others of the justification for their own U.S. foreign policy-related 
actions. 
5. Step 3 (Node): Domestic Executors and Foreign Actors (T-Loss) 
Both domestic and foreign actors receive the tidbits of U.S. foreign policy that are 
directed most pointedly at them, and thereafter attempt to respond appropriately under the 
assumption that what they are receiving is official U.S. foreign policy. Both sides begin 
the process of attempting to respond to the foreign policy signaling they receive, but the 
results of their deliberation receive little feedback from the general public, and is thus 
subject to the personal biases and filters of the unelected members of the Executive 
Branch. Thus, a T-Loss occurs here. 
6. Step 3.5 (Connection): Domestic Executors Transform Foreign 
Policies into Action (T-Loss) 
Through various chains of command, actors in the Executive Department like the 
DOS and DOD scour existing policy documents, take directives from meetings with 
superiors, engage in communication via email, and do many other things to help clarify 
for themselves what the foreign policies are that they need to plan to execute. Executive 
Department actors then transform this policy guidance into the strategies, operations, and 
tactics used to satisfy the nation's policy objectives. Unfortunately, members of the 
Executive Department are trying to do so with twice-filtered, disaggregated foreign 
policies as a starting point. Also, the U.S. public has little-to-no opportunity to provide 
 45
input on the development of these strategies, operations, and tactics.165 After deciding 
upon courses of action by which to execute foreign policies, domestic executors transmit 
words and action to foreign actors. 
7. Step 4 (Node): Foreign Actors 
Foreign actors listen for as many tidbits of twice-filtered, disaggregated foreign 
policies as they can and try to “read the tea leaves” in order to understand the real 
message the U.S. is sending them. Messages to foreign governments often take the form 
of American media statements, domestic American legislation, military deployments, or 
DOS messaging.  
8. Step 4.5 (Connection): Foreign Actors Respond through Filtered 
Connections (T-Loss) 
Without a way to accurately target their return messaging, foreign actors respond 
to U.S. actions with actions that fall somewhere along the spectrum of foreign policy 
explicitness, but it is frequently unclear to what specific U.S. foreign policies they are 
responding. 
9. Step 5 (Node): Domestic Actors 
Provided they are paying close enough attention to the outside world and know 
how to recognize the foreign policy signaling they are being sent by foreign actors, 
domestic actors receive some amount of feedback response vis-à-vis their actions. As an 
example of what this and the next step entail, the DOS recently started to use social 
networks like Twitter to digitally monitor foreign actor response and associate it as 
feedback to particular U.S. foreign policies.166 Such semantic association of foreign 
policy to feedback is a great step in the right direction, and is emblematic of the types of 
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communication efficiency gains that can be had by having explicit foreign policies 
around which to organize digital foreign policy networks.167 
10. Step 5.5 (Connection): Domestic Actors Filter the Feedback in a 
Variety of Ways (T-Loss) 
Taking the foreign actor feedback that they detected, domestic actors then try to 
figure out what the signals from the outside world mean, and, after making assumptions 
that are certainly the product of bias filters, associate the feedback with particular foreign 
policies to which they believe the foreign actors are responding. Domestic actors like the 
government and the media then turn this messaging around and inform the American 
public through a wide variety of communication channels. Bias is introduced when the 
government and the media decide what external feedback is important enough to report to 
the American people. 
11. Step 6 (Node): U.S. Citizens (T-Min) 
Finally, after having gone through so many distortional nodes and connections, 
U.S. citizens receive filtered feedback from the outside world (via biased domestic 
sources) in response to the foreign policies for which they provided the original source of 
legitimacy. U.S. citizens then have the opportunity to adjust their opinions and support 
for particular foreign policies again, restarting the feedback loop to Step 1.168 
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Figure 1.  Current Foreign Policy System Flow Model169 
C. FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES 
The weaknesses in the systemic flow above are fairly obvious, but not 
insurmountable. A common weakness in all the connective steps is that both foreign and 
domestic actors are forced to dig through every public statement that they can get their 
hands on in order to get a holistic picture of U.S. foreign policy. As it stands, there is no 
integrative framework that can consolidate U.S. foreign policy and remove the effects of 
the various filtering mechanisms. As Henry Kissinger has aptly noted, consultation with 
foreign powers on policy issues is difficult without “an integrating over-all framework” 
that makes it clear what the central issues under discussion are.170 Systems engineering 
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can provide some clarity to how foreign policies could be presented under such a 
framework. 
1. Basic Systems Engineering Principles: Modularity, Uniqueness, and 
Exchange 
The systems engineering principles of modularity, uniqueness, and exchange are 
the foundations upon which strong systems are formed.171 I reviewed systems 
engineering literature in search of a way to remove inefficiencies in foreign policy 
systems and quantitatively validate whether making foreign policies more explicit 
actually improves the relationship between two states. In describing systems that have 
been engineered with multiple stakeholders in mind, Gary Langford notes that strategies 
should be aligned “toward a common goal” from the outset in order to improve 
outcomes. The resulting level of integration of the elements of the system is only as good 
as the level to which it reflects stakeholder requirements.172 Integrated systems are made 
up of parts that create a complete system: relations, characteristics, and unity.173 In his 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis “The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting 
Effectiveness Theory to Work,” Olav Schram Stokke also shows that there is still 
difficulty in defining the nature of the connections between independent nodes in an 
institutional interplay taxonomy. A system that visualizes this taxonomy but is flexible 
enough to change the values of its node connections is the best foundation from which to 
start explicitly defining the value of relationships (concurrence and non-concurrence) on 
specific issues.174 In other words, the U.S.-China relationship is best served when the 
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policies of both parties are made explicit and the relationships between each others' 
policies are made clear. The importance of explicitly-stated policies is most visible in the 
agreements that states must sign in order to participate in international institutions; these 
agreements, like the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), form the nodes 
around which networks of both action and international discussion are built. 
While Professor Langford describes the fundamental units of exchange between 
nodes in a system as being Energy, Matter, Material wealth, and Information (EMMI), 
his study does not explicitly apply EMMI to the operation and behavior of a foreign 
policy system. Further discussions with Professor Langford as an advisor on this thesis 
have led to the conclusion that the concept of EMMI is extensible to foreign policy 
systems.175 Based on Russ Berkoff’s NPS thesis on “Artificial Intelligence and Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making,”176 the aforementioned work by Stokke, and work by Leon 
Fuerth and Evan Farber,177 I posit that individual foreign policies are the fundamental, 
independent systemic nodes in the foreign policy system, and can therefore benefit from 
being modular and unique. 
2. Applying Systems Engineering Principles to Foreign Policies: 
Building Blocks 
A foreign policy that is both modular and unique has a few key characteristics that 
make it compatible not only with one state's foreign policy, but has the potential to help 
all states' foreign policies more compatibly interact. A foreign policy that is modular, like 
                                                 
175 NPS thesis advisor meeting, Oct. 31, 2013. 
176 Berkoff, Artificial Intelligence and Foreign, 162. 
177 Leon Fuerth and Evan Faber, Anticipatory Governance: Winning the Future (Bethesda, MD: The 
Futurist, 2013). 
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“Build Security Globally,”178 is a discrete, explicit statement of foreign policy. Its 
modularity allows it to be pointed to as a reference node not only by subordinate foreign 
policies, but also by strategies devised to enable its achievement, operations undertaken 
to achieve strategic effects, and tactics used in particular operations. At each step, 
modular nodes in this chain should ideally have the ability to trace their origin of 
legitimacy back to “Build Security Globally.” The benefits of such modularity are 
numerous. Provided the “Build Security Globally” foreign policy is advertised widely 
enough as official, top-level U.S. foreign policy, domestic actors like NGOs and 
corporations that would not normally align their actions with U.S. foreign policy may 
rally around such a common national policy, focus their actions in its pursuit, and 
appropriately report achievement metrics in a way that can provide feedback into the 
system. As it stands, though, “Build Security Globally” as a potentially modular and 
universally acceptable foreign policy is trapped inside the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR), tainted somewhat by its primary association to the U.S. military. Finding 
foreign policy consensus between two states can be challenging,179 but a singular 
collection of modular foreign policies like “Build Security Globally” that can be 
referenced by both subordinate U.S. organizations like the DOS and DOD and foreign 
                                                 
178 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014: Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Defense, 2014). Per Max Stier, Lloyd Howell, Building the Enterprise: Nine Strategies 
for a More Integrated, Effective Government (Washington, DC: Booz Allen Hamilton Partnership for 
Public Service, 2013), 4, this is an example of a cross-cutting goal that single federal agencies are incapable 
of addressing alone. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government: 
Practices that can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO Report GAO-
06-15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004), 10 for how the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) asserts that the definition of “common outcomes” and “compatible policies” 
is the top key to creating collaboration between federal agencies. 
179 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 12. 
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countries alike has the potential to unify a great deal of global effort around a set of 
common objectives.180 
Uniqueness is a principle that has come to the forefront of systems engineering in 
the past few decades as a primary means of organization in the field of Internet data 
management, but it is also directly compatible with the concept of modularity. Within 
digital systems, uniqueness allows individual entities to be targeted directly. For example, 
each Uniform Resource Locator (URL) on the internet is a unique address for the content 
that lies behind it.181 As a complementary example, in Twitter, each hashtag (#) label like 
“#Diplomacy”, “#ForeignPolicy”, and “#Russia” serves as a unique digital reference at 
which individual tweets can be targeted, and around which a chaotic and global 
conversation on those topics can be aggregated. In the midst of chaotic systems, 
uniqueness provides a framework around which to build organized systems. A similar 
usage of uniqueness is readily applicable to foreign policies that have been made 
modular, broadcast publicly, and made digitally accessible. Not only can subordinate 
strategies, operations, and tactics in the foreign policy system be sourced through linked 
chains back to the uniquely identified policy “Build Security Globally,” a whole host of 
other aspects of the foreign policy system can be directly linked as well. For example, all 
the metrics identified as being germane to the effective execution of “Build Security 
Globally” can be easily aggregated digitally and used to evaluate the performance of the 
                                                 
180 See 三菱 UFJ リサーチ＆コンサルティング (Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting), 
諸外国における業績目標の達成度の把握に関する調査研究 (Research into Understanding the 
Measurement of Effectiveness in Foreign Businesses) (Japanese Government: 日本総務省 (Japan Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications), 2005) for an analysis of the different ways that different 
countries assess the effectiveness of their foreign diplomacy programs. The report specifically analyzes the 
differing methods of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and Canada. Some countries call them 
“Strategic Objectives”, or “Outcomes”, or “Effectiveness of Contributions to Outcomes”, but they are all 
attempting to measure the same thing: whether the government's actions are contributing effectively to the 
government's goals. 
181 Lunn, RDFa Support, 2:00. 
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foreign policy system as a whole.182 The same could be done for the budgeting that is 
applied to the full spectrum of U.S. activities undertaken in support of “Build Security 
Globally.” The two fundamental systems engineering concepts of modularity and 
uniqueness form the foundation of an optimized foreign policy system. 
D. FLOW OPTIMIZATION: THE FOREIGN POLICY SUPPLY CHAIN 
With the fundamental systems engineering principles of modularity and 
uniqueness thus defined, I will describe the supply chain model that will form the basis 
for the development of an improved foreign policy system flow. 
1. The Supply Chain: A Tool for System Flow Analysis 
Many organizations use supply chain modeling to determine how effective they 
are at utilizing resources toward the execution of their organizational mandate;183 supply 
chain modeling can similarly be used to discover whether the U.S. is using its foreign 
policy system resources, namely legitimacy in the form of Trust (T), in the most effective 
way possible. Within industry, supply chain modeling is made fairly simple by the 
                                                 
182 See Fiorenzo Franceschini and Maurizio Galetto and Domenico Maisano, Management by 
Measurement: Designing Key Indicators and Performance Measurement Systems (New York, NY: 
Springer, 2007), 8 for how every metric should have a specific target for which it is being measured; 
without a target, there is no reason for something to be measured. Also see Kaufmann, Aggregating 
Governance Indicators for the methods and usefulness of creating aggregate indicators. Also see George 
Yee, The State and Scientific Basis of Cyber Security Metrics: Including Canadian Perspectives (Ottawa, 
CR: Defence R&D Canada, 2012), 1 for how a metric should be capable of being represented as a point in 
time progressing either toward or away from a goal. 
183 See Steve New, Supply Chains: Construction and Legitimation (UK: Oxford University, 2004) and 
Jeremy Shapiro, Modeling the Supply Chain (Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury, 2004) and ChristopherTang and 
Chung-Piaw Teo and Kwok Kee Wei, Supply Chain Analysis: A Handbook on the Interaction of 
Information, System and Optimization (Stanford, CA: Springer, 2008) and Larry Klapper et. al., Supply 
Chain Management: A Recommended Performance Measurement Scorecard (McLean, VA: Logistics 
Management Institute, 1999) and Douglas Lambert, Supply Chain Management: Processes, Partnerships, 
Performance (Sarasota, FL: Supply Chain Management Institute, 2008) and Marc Goetschalckx, Supply 
Chain Engineering (New York, NY: Springer, 2011) for an explanation of supply chain engineering. I 
chose to use a supply chain model because, similar to logistics management systems, I understand foreign 
policies as systems of legitimacy that contain a flow of resources between nodes in the system. 
Additionally, Ibid., 13 explains that the resources that flow through the a supply chain system can be 
“materials,” “information,” or “monetary,” among likely many other things. This turned out to be 
fundamentally compatible with the systems engineering concept of EMMI explicated in Langford, Toward 
A General Theory. 
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existence of obvious performance metrics.184 Companies manufacture products for one 
price, and attempt to distribute and sell products for a higher price. Any reductions in 
profitability that result from the supply chain between production and sale are reduced in 
order to maximize profitability. Publicly-traded corporations also benefit from an 
external valuation of supply chain effectiveness in the form of stock prices. The net result 
of having a currency by which to evaluate system effectiveness is an increase in the ease 
with which the efficiency of the system can be visualized and optimized in a variety of 
ways. A corporation that is sourcing materials from two companies may try to 
consolidate their orders toward a single source in order to achieve economies of scale and 
better prices. A factory that discovers certain employees can be made redundant because 
of process improvements may certainly consider relocating those employees elsewhere. 
As a corollary to the use of money as a currency in business systems, I propose that Trust 
(T) can be used as a currency to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign policy systems. 
2. The “Stuff” That Flows: Trust (T) 
I have thus far made passing mention to Trust (T) and "T-Loss" in this thesis, but 
have not yet provided an explanation of its function as a currency in foreign policy 
systems. I am not the first person to consider the use of trust as a currency. Though it 
serves as a somewhat trite example, Harold Nicolson asserts that trust was the currency 
of pre-1918 old diplomacy, but believes that it has been replaced as valid “coinage” by 
the willingness of diplomats to brazenly lie to achieve state objectives.185 I use T in a 
somewhat different, but not incompatible sense. Within the foreign policy system, T is 
built up primarily by the citizens of a country that, through participation with their 
representatives in government, provide legitimacy to the foreign policies that are decided 
upon and executed by agents of the state. The measurement of some precise value of T by 
some combination of relative or direct metrics is not consequential for the purposes of 
                                                 
184 See Carl Hoffmann and Eric Lesser and Tim Ringo, Calculating Success: How the New Workplace 
Analytics Will Revitalize Your Organization (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012), 1 for 
how strategic vision must be balanced against the resources required to achieve it, and how metrics are 
used to ensure an organization is using resources effectively. 
185 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 245. 
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this study, but would nevertheless make for an interesting study. In measuring the 
effectiveness of the foreign policy system, it is only necessary to focus on how T 
degrades as it passes through the system and eventually finds its way back to its source 
where it can be recharged. As shown in the model of the existing U.S. foreign policy 
system above, the value of T is degraded in a variety of ways at each step of the foreign 
policy supply chain. Using the value of T as a feedback mechanism, it is now easier to 
see where foreign policy system efficiencies can be discovered. Just as corporations seek 
to maximize profit, states should seek to maximize T in their foreign policies. Taking into 
consideration the systems engineering principles of modularity and uniqueness explored 
above, in the next section I provide an example of how the U.S. foreign policy system 
could be structured in order to maximize T. 
E. MAXIMIZING T: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN 
POLICIES 
In order to maximize T, all foreign policies should be consolidated into a single, 
authoritative, publicly accessible repository. The reason for this is that it focuses the 
foreign policy system as a whole on specific and common objectives, from initial debate 
to foreign policy execution. Various aspects of the foreign policy “Build Security 
Globally” can be achieved in an unimaginable variety of ways. So many possibilities 
exist, in fact, that centralized planning of all the potentially positive activities to be 
undertaken in support of this objective could never hope to define them all.186 Foreign 
policy objectives can be achieved in a wide variety of ways by a wide variety of actors, 
but the foreign policies themselves must first be consolidated and agreed upon before 
they can form the foundation of such a network. 
In comparison to the less effective foreign policy system flow described above, a 
more efficient and effective path exists between U.S. citizens and the boots and wingtips 
                                                 
186 The occasional utility of disaggregation does not imply that there will ever come a day when the 
usefulness of the effects brought about by DOS or DOD efforts toward accomplishing “Build Global 
Security” will ever be eclipsed by non-government actors, but the described system at least provides a 
context within which broader participation can occur in line with the national interest, and in line with a 
more harmonized DOS and DOD effort as well. 
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on the ground executing U.S. foreign policy. What follows is a step-by-step walkthrough 
of a streamlined U.S. foreign policy systemic flow. The focus of this flow analysis is to 
show where Trust (T) that was lost in the previous system can be regained as it flows 
through this system. Of note, inherent in the background of this streamlined system flow 
is the existence of a robust implementation of the afore-described consolidated system of 
foreign policies built on systems engineering principles; I generically call this system the 
Foreign Policy System (FPS). 
a. Step 1 (Node): U.S. Citizens. (T-Max) 
Within the context of existing social networking tools that have created systems 
compatible and integrated with the U.S. FPS, U.S. citizens participate in ongoing 
discussions about the merits of specific foreign policies. Much of this discussion is noise, 
but occasionally specific and well-reasoned recommendations bubble up from places like 
academia and gain traction. 
b. Step 2 (Node): National Leadership. 
Through automated systems of their own, both Congress and the president 
monitor the consolidated feedback targeted at the FPS by every social network of 
significance. Thus informed by fluctuations and trends in the national interest, national 
leaders begin conversations on how to adapt specific foreign policies and their execution 
to better satisfy the national interest. Because citizens are providing feedback on every 
foreign policy in the FPS all at once, and doing so directly within context, the T-Loss in 
the previous system flow's Step 1.5 is mitigated. The previous T-Loss incurred by the 
biases of national leaders is also better mitigated by the improved citizen oversight 
capability brought about by increased foreign policy explicitness. 
c. Step 3 (Node): Domestic and Foreign Actors. 
As soon as an official change to U.S. foreign policy is registered to the FPS, both 
domestic and foreign actors are notified of the change immediately. Domestic actors with 
the U.S. Executive Branch, like the DOS and DOD can immediately begin adjusting all 
subordinate strategies, operations, and tactics to fall in line with the new foreign policy 
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realities. Foreign actors will have to wait for the results of these domestic adjustments, 
but at the very least they have an official, updated U.S. foreign policy to which they can 
reorient their own state's foreign policies. Because both domestic and foreign actors are 
reorienting based on a single source of U.S. foreign policy, the T-Loss in the previous 
system flow's Step 2.5 is mitigated. 
d. Step 4 (Node): Foreign Actors. 
In receipt of both U.S. foreign policy statements and action after U.S. actors have 
completed adjusting to the new foreign policy and begun to implement strategies, 
operations, and tactics based on it, foreign actors have a chance to provide feedback on 
the full spectrum of U.S. actions associated with the foreign policy. Their feedback is 
targeted not into the “void,” but digitally at the U.S. FPS. Because foreign actors are 
targeting feedback at specific U.S. foreign policies in the FPS, the T-Loss in the previous 
system flow's Step 3.5 is mitigated. 
e. Step 5 (Node): U.S. Citizens. 
Within the context of the specific foreign policies that they are interested in, and 
within their social networks of choice, U.S. citizens receive direct and official responses 
from foreign countries to the foreign policies they are interested in. Because the filtering 
and explaining role of the U.S. domestic government and media can be bypassed, the T-
Loss in the previous system flow's Steps 4.5, 5, and 5.5 are mitigated. 
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Figure 2.  Idealized Foreign Policy System Flow Model 
With all foreign policies thus aggregated in a modular and digitally targetable 
format with unique identifiers, domestic and global actors can begin to digitally link 
specific strategies, operations, tactics, metrics, budgeting, and other associated entities to 
their appropriate foreign policies.187 The spontaneous growth that such a system should 
expect would have been scarcely imaginable a few decades ago, but such so-called 
                                                 
187 See Patrick Sweeney, A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System (Newport, R.I.: Naval 
War College, 2013), 11 for how the APEX national security strategy planning system was designed 
specifically to allow viewers of strategic objectives to drill all the way down into supporting tactical 
activities, providing a complete semantic linkage. All the system is missing is the policies that inform the 
top-level strategies. Also see Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-
0: Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), ix for how strategic direction focuses the 
whole national security system: “Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes 
the planning activities and operations of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, 
JFCs, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. It provides 
purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force.” 
 58
“network effects” are increasingly studied to determine commonalities and associated 
externalities.188 The end result of this thought experiment is a potentially very agile and 
responsive global foreign policy network. There is ample cause for concern about the 
realities that implementing various aspects of this system would bring about, but the fact 
that it reduces T, leading to a theoretical increase in the effectiveness of the system as a 
whole, is clear. In order to determine whether such a system is truly benign, a robust 
network of associated metrics will need to be attached to it. 
F. UP NEXT: APPLICABILITY TO U.S.-CHINA FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The discovery of communication-based weaknesses in generalized foreign policy 
systems is highly germane to the failures and successes of U.S.-China foreign relations 
since 1949. In a recent piece reported on by the Korea Herald, Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM) Admiral Locklear stressed the importance of explicit foreign policy 
signaling and communication when he highlighted “. . .the need to establish a key 
military communication channel with China.” He said, “I don’t have the ability to pick up 
a phone and talk directly to a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy admiral or general at 
the time of a crisis. And we need to work on that.”189 There is great risk in silence, and 
even greater risk in the misinterpretation of inexplicit foreign policy actions. The only 
way to mitigate this risk is to communicate foreign policy intent better by doing so more 
explicitly, and consequently more efficiently and more effectively. Though the results of 
my analysis of foreign policy systems from a systems engineering perspective in this 
chapter seem to assert that increasing foreign policy explicitness improves the stability 
and effectiveness of the foreign policy system as a whole, it remains to be seen how the 
concept of foreign policy explicitness functions in reality; for this, we need an empirical 
example, and the U.S.-China relationship since 1949 provides the perfect opportunity to 
examine a state-state dyad from the ground-up. When the U.S. and China had no paths 
                                                 
188 See Vern Clark, Michael Haggee, FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: United States Government, 2005), 5 for how Vern Clark and Michael Haggee imagined 
that the usefulness of FORCEnet network services would exponentially increase as the number of users 
increased. 
189 The Korea Herald, “U.S. Updating N.K. Contingency Plans: Pacific Commander,” The Korea 
Herald, accessed Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140124000473. 
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for diplomatic communication, the Korean War was a result. Once national leaders were 
communicating, the foundation for future growth was established. Finally, once particular 
political and economic policies were made explicit enough to allow disaggregated 
collaboration by a large array of national actors, the stability and mutual productivity of 
the U.S.-China relationship began to reach the point where it is now. I explore the role of 
foreign policy explicitness in shaping these realities in the next chapter. 
G. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CONCLUSION: INCREASE MODULARITY 
AND UNIQUENESS 
In this chapter I explored foreign policies from a systems engineering perspective 
and discovered that there are potentially highly beneficial gains to be made by increasing 
the explicitness of foreign policies. Within the systems engineering context, explicitness 
takes the form of modularity and uniqueness, and when properly implemented these 
properties can mitigate some of the inefficiencies that can arise in the connections 
between nodes in the foreign policy system. A digital foreign policy system built upon 
these principles has the potential to greatly streamline the feedback loop between 
citizens, their national leaders, and interested foreign actors vis-à-vis specific foreign 
policies,190 and thereby improve the effectiveness of those foreign policies. The next 
chapter is focused on the history of U.S.-China relations since 1949 and the role that 
foreign policy explicitness has played in shaping that relationship's growth. 
  
                                                 
190 See Sheila Ronis, Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex 
Future (Carlisle, PA: The United States Army War College, 2013), 16 for how policies can only be 
improved through a systematic feedback loop that directly associates metrics to policies so that 
stakeholders can agree on how to measure and periodically reassess what their government is trying to 
execute. Such a system will also likely be more resilient and robust than the traditional system, and loosen 
the influence coupling of any particular individual or institution. See Scott Hatch, “Managing the 
“Reliability Cycle”: An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure,” Studies in 
Intelligence 57, no. 2 (2013), 35 for a discussion of the perils of “tight coupling.” 
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III. THE INCREASING EXPLICITNESS OF U.S.-CHINA 
RELATIONS 
In this chapter I examine key inflection points in U.S.-China relations since the 
founding of the People's Republic of China and determine the role that the explicitness of 
foreign policies played in the improvement of U.S.-China relations.191 A key 
fundamental question that it helps to keep in mind at each step in this investigation is “by 
what means are the U.S. and China communicating, and where does that communication 
fall on the foreign policy explicitness spectrum?” In the midst of a hurricane of domestic 
and international events, crafting and transmitting foreign policy is not easy. An 
important thing to remember is that from the perspective of a state, foreign policy is 
crafted to satisfy the “national interest,” and despite each state's unique internal 
complexities, foreign policies present a state as a unitary whole to the world. 
Domestically, actors, institutions, and history all play key roles in shaping how a state's 
national interest is defined. A key step in the creation of foreign policy, therefore, is the 
conversion of domestic, tacit, inexplicit national interest into explicit, coherent foreign 
policy output targeted effectively at foreign audiences. The explicitness of this foreign 
policy output can vary widely as states choose the types of foreign policy messages and 
methods to communicate their foreign policy objectives. 
As mentioned, all state-to-state foreign policy communication falls somewhere 
along a foreign policy explicitness spectrum. On the low end of the spectrum, foreign 
policy intent is inexplicit, unclear, and open to miscalculation. On the high end of the 
spectrum, foreign policy intent is highly explicit, clear, and helps foreign states shape 
their expectations and foreign policy responses. Deploying warships to operating areas 
off the coast of another country without any attempt at diplomatic explanation leaves 
more room for miscalculation than if such a deployment were accompanied by some kind 
                                                 
191  Note the basic and very firm assertion that, yes, U.S.-China relations have improved on multiple fronts 
since 1949. See Michael Swaine and Alastair Iain Johnston, China Joins the World (Washington, DC: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 90 for the view that the U.S. and China, along with much of the rest 
of the international community, have expressed a basic desire for peace and security, and the intent to avoid 
arms races that might destabilize efforts toward achieving that goal. 
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of statement. The explicitness of the foreign policy that led to the deployment of military 
warships could also be increased a little with statements in domestic media, increased 
further by domestic legislation, and increased even further by some kind of bilateral 
understanding about the deployment of the warships. Unilateral, unexplained foreign 
policy actions192 are low on the spectrum, encourage miscalculation, and often lead to 
counter-productive conflict or long-term consequences to a state's international image; 
multilateral, agreed-upon foreign policy actions are higher on the spectrum and 
encourage cooperation in the spirit of shared national interests. In analyzing the growth of 
the U.S.-China relationship, the explicitness spectrum is a useful analysis tool. 
In order to determine the role that foreign policy explicitness has played in U.S.-
China relations, I reviewed historical literature and identified key inflection points in 
U.S.-China relations. In the decades following the miserable depths of U.S.-China foreign 
policy communication prior to the U.S. crossing the 38th Parallel into North Korea in the 
Korean War,193 American and Chinese leaders progressively made increasingly explicit 
overtures toward rapprochement. Building on a mutual understanding that improved 
U.S.-China relations could help bring balance to the Asia-Pacific region in the Cold War, 
the U.S. and China passed through a series of trust-building wickets: the Chinese 
government invited a U.S. table tennis team to China in April of 1971, President Nixon 
went to China in 1972, and both countries signed the first bilateral Communique the same 
year. Were such increasingly explicit declarations the necessary precursors to improved 
U.S.-China relations afterwards? The answer to that question has played out multiple 
times in the period between 1972 and now. Wang Jisi,194 Wu Xinbo,195 and Michael 
Chase196 all show separately that, whether through the proxies of citizen-to-citizen 
                                                 
192 Consider the actions taken by Russia during the early-2014 crises in Ukraine. 
193 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 106. 
194 Wang Jisi, “China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign 
Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011), 3. 
195 Wu Xinbo, Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2013), 374. 
196 Michael Chase, “China's Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship,’” China Brief 12, 
no. 17 (2012). 
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interaction or multilateral engagement, the simple act of explicit and constructive 
engagement on foreign policy between the U.S. and China has led to improvements in 
bilateral relations. In spite of mixed signaling and the absence of an officially blessed 
conduit for diplomacy, Jeffrey Bader also notes that informal or multilateral feedback 
loops have allowed the U.S. and China to successfully weather bilateral crises of 
conscience like the Tiananmen Square Massacre.197 These and other examples tend to 
show causation between explicit constructive engagement on foreign policy matters and 
improvements in U.S.-China bilateral foreign relations. Fundamentally, regardless of the 
source of the impetus to change relations between two countries, if the desire to change 
foreign policy is not made explicit in some way, nothing can change. Just as the systems 
engineering analysis in the previous chapter showed, increasing explicitness leads to 
more effective foreign policy systems. 
A. THE DANGERS OF SILENCE: THE KOREAN WAR 
Chinese involvement in the Korean War might have been precluded if better 
channels for foreign policy communication had existed between the fledgling government 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States.198 After a great deal of 
diplomatic wrangling in the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s victory over the Kuomintang 
(KMT) and subsequent founding of the PRC in 1949, U.S.-China diplomatic relations 
descended into a dark period. In April of 1950, the U.S. Consul General to Beijing, O. 
Edmund Clubb, was recalled to the U.S. after being treated harshly by the PRC 
government, leaving only indirect communication lines available between the two 
governments. Even the indirect channel, however, was actually the Indian Ambassador, 
who “was considered by the West to be an unreliable reporter.”199 This pitiful condition 
of state-to-state communications persisted, and on the 25th of June in 1950, North 
                                                 
197 Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 78. 
198 See Wittkopf, The Domestic Sources of American, 260 for just one example of a broader literature 
that shows that China's involvement in the Korean War was a product of miscommunication and mutual 
miscalculation and could have been avoided; the same reference also asserts that such a perspective on the 
Korean War has not filtered out to the broader U.S. public. 
199 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War. 
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Korean artillery started the Korean War. After months of fighting between North Korean 
troops and a coalition of American, South Korean, and United Nations troops—which at 
times did not appear to be going well for the coalition—General MacArthur's bold 
invasion at Inchon on the 15th of September, 1950 reversed the tide of the war. After 
gaining the upper hand, the U.S. had a choice to make: whether to stop its northward 
advance at the 38th Parallel and end the Korean War at the pre-war status quo, or to 
continue north and try to unify the peninsula under non-Communist South Korean rule. 
This decision was a key turning point, and would lead to three more years of war. 
In the early stages of the U.S. Cold War with the Soviet Union, pushing back the 
boundaries of the Communist sphere of influence to the Northern borders of the Korean 
peninsula was a very attractive foreign policy option for the U.S.; conversely, the idea of 
living without a buffer state between the itself and democracy on the Korean peninsula 
frightened the PRC. Under pressure from both North Korea and the Soviet Union to 
intervene in the Korean War on the 1st of October in 1950, Mao warned the United States 
not to cross North of the 38th Parallel; he did so, however, through a string of proxies. On 
the 2nd of October, Mao had his foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, relay the following foreign 
policy to the U.S. through the only diplomatic channel he had available, the “unreliable” 
Indian ambassador K. M. Panikkar: China did not care if South Korean soldiers invaded 
North Korea, but China would get directly involved in the war if Americans crossed the 
38th Parallel.200 The United States ignored this warning, and MacArthur ordered 
American and coalition troops to cross the 38th Parallel on the 8th of October, 1950. The 
effects of this decision have been hotly debated by historians ever since. 
Blame for the escalation of the Korean War can be placed on both the United 
States and China. While the decision to escalate was ultimately made by Mao, Henry 
Kissinger holds that a diplomatic option was never considered by any of the parties in the 
lead up to Chinese involvement in the Korean War.201 Lu Ning argues that, up until the 
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28th of September, Mao held out hope that he might not have to intervene.202 Michael 
Yahuda concurs that “the decision to intervene was not an easy one,” noting also that 
“there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese leadership was divided over the 
question.”203 Zhang Qingmin blames Truman for breaking his promise and getting 
involved in the civil conflict in China, specifically referring to Truman's decision to put 
the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait at the outbreak of the Korean War.204 William Stueck 
places blame on the sense of obligation the Chinese felt toward North Korea as a result of 
the support that North Korean soldiers gave to Mao's revolution.205 Chen Jian blames the 
U.S. for emboldening the Soviet Union by excluding Korea from America's Western 
Pacific Defense Perimeter, and blames China and North Korea's boldness on the implicit 
and explicit overtures of support they were receiving from the Soviet Union.206 Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, Thomas Christensen asserts that “. . . .while friendship 
between China and the United States was precluded by their ideological differences, 
peace between the two nations was not.”207 As such, while more than enough blame has 
already been thrown around, it is clear that a root cause exists. 
I blame the escalation of the Korean War on a failure by both the U.S. and China 
to communicate their foreign policies at a high enough level of explicitness. A path to 
avoid violence existed in early 1950, but both the United States and China failed to 
maintain communications and failed to make clear the foreign policy objectives that were 
guiding their actions. Based on the information that both states had about each other’s 
intent, the U.S. and China were acting rationally from the perspective of realist IR theory; 
however, if both sides had better communicated their underlying national interest, the 
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range of rational actions might have been constrained in a way that precluded war. There 
was more to be gained through U.S.-Chinese cooperation than there was through war, but 
in the absence of explicit foreign policies, ideology obscured opportunity. Debate about 
what paths forward might have led the U.S. and China to lean more toward each other in 
1950 is a never-ending exercise in conjecture, but the trappings of low foreign policy 
explicitness are clear. From the systems engineering perspective, the lack of a connection 
between American and Chinese foreign policies toward each other led to both systems 
ineffectively responding in the best interests of both countries. The absence of external 
feedback produces ineffective foreign policy systems. It would take two decades for the 
national interest of both U.S. and China to align again, but an increase in the explicitness 
of foreign policy communication in the 1970s created a foundation for deeper and more 
mutually beneficial cooperation. 
 
Figure 3.  U.S. China Foreign Policy Communication before the Korean War 
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B. BREAKING THE ICE: THE FIRST AGREED-UPON FOREIGN POLICY 
STATEMENTS 
The fundamental key to the improvements in the U.S.-China relationship in the 
1970s was the increasing explicitness of the foreign policies expressed by both 
countries.208 As the relationship emerged from almost complete silence after the Korean 
War, increasingly detailed and sometimes secretive communications allowed common 
ground to be discovered. Starting with the Shanghai Communique in 1972 and 
concluding with the Joint Communique of 1982, increasingly explicit foreign policy 
declarations broke the ice between the U.S. and China and created the foundation upon 
which all modern mutually beneficial U.S.-China activity is based.209 
1. The Shanghai Communique of 1972: Building Trust from Silence 
In 1970, the U.S. and China's official foreign policies toward each other existed 
only tacitly in the heads of a few American and Chinese elites; it would take a decade for 
the intricate complexities of the national interest of both countries to be balanced 
appropriately with correspondingly intricate semantics in the form of four explicit 
declarations of bilateral, agreed-upon foreign policy. The first of such foreign policy 
agreements, the Shanghai Communique of 1972, was the product of a long and winding 
road of secretive diplomacy between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard 
Nixon, and struck a very careful semantic balance indicative of the international 
complexities of the time. 
a. Step One. Is it in the National Interest? If yes, continue. 
Various historians point to various genesis points for the U.S.-China path to 
rapprochement, but the key point for the purposes of this thesis is that rapprochement was 
the product of increasingly explicit expressions of foreign policy objectives. From the 
                                                 
208 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign, 140 shows how the U.S. and China came together in 
1971 not out of ideological optimism, but because of a common threat from the Soviet Union. The 
explicitly expressed fear of a common enemy is just as unifying as any other increase in foreign policy 
explicitness. 
209 He Di, The Great Powers in East Asia - 1953-1960 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 244. 
 68
U.S. side, President Nixon was viewed by many has being a hard-liner toward China, but 
even before his Presidency he was dropping subtle hints at the need to improve U.S. 
relations with China.210 From China's side, Chairman Mao was a pragmatist with a 
history of anti-U.S. sentiment, but was dropping his own hints toward rapprochement in 
the early ’70s.211 Both sides needed each other,212 but lacked a normalized framework 
through which to communicate. Regardless of where the initial impetus for 
rapprochement came from, the geopolitical realities of the time and compatible national 
interests made it “kismet.”213 The question, then, was not whether, but how to improve 
U.S.-China relations; in order to ensure both sides could save face, bilateral improvement 
without domestic risk to self led the leaders of both countries to conduct diplomacy in 
secret.214 
b. Step Two. Communicating Diplomatic Intent: A Sometimes Secretive 
Path 
When Nixon stepped off the plane as the first U.S. president to visit the PRC, his 
primary goal was to secure some kind of explicit agreement from China that could serve 
as the foundation for further U.S.-China cooperation. Getting to the tarmac in Shanghai, 
though, was not easy. In the face of difficult domestic political environments, both Nixon 
and Mao knew that the failure of rapprochement was entirely possible, and that the loss 
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of face incurred from trying and failing to find common ground might endanger any 
future attempts at rapprochement as well.215 Thus, as representatives of their countries, 
Nixon and Mao decided to initially use back channels to communicate their foreign 
policy intent to improve relations. On Nixon's side, Henry Kissinger served as the vessel 
of this message;216 on Mao's side, Zhou Enlai served the same purpose.217 Without the 
ability to communicate in some way, rapprochement might never have happened. Indeed, 
initial rapprochement talks were conducted so secretly that when Nixon announced his 
intent to travel to China, a shockwave ran through the world.218 Nevertheless, the secrecy 
of the tender initial stages of rapprochement were important because they served as an 
“elaboration” of “shared purposes,” which proved to be an integral key to breaking the 
ice between the U.S. and China.219 After establishing the initial lines of communication 
and creating the diplomatic context through which to find consensus on a way forward, 
the all-important semantics of the Shanghai Communique still needed to be discovered, 
and that was no easy task. 
c. Step Three. Finding Agreeable Language: Careful Wording 
The Shanghai Communique of 1972 is renowned for the subtleties of its language, 
but without a clever way to move beyond the Taiwan Question, U.S.-China cooperation 
on any issue might not have been possible. Ever since Mao scared the U.S.-backed KMT 
off mainland China during his consolidation of power over China, the question of 
Taiwan's status with regard to China has colored much of U.S.-China relations. On the 
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one hand, in 1972 the government of Taiwan claimed that the KMT had a legitimate 
claim to rule all of a unified China that included both mainland China and Taiwan, a 
position which at the time the U.S. still supported. On the other hand, mainland China 
held that the PRC was the rightful ruler of both the mainland and Taiwan. Finding a 
diplomatic middle ground between these two completely incompatible positions was the 
crowning achievement of the Shanghai Communique; quoted in full, “The United States 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but 
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not 
challenge that position.”220 This single, controversial, “agree to disagree” statement 
formed the foundation that allowed the U.S.-China relationship to move forward toward 
further refinements of the national interest of both sides. Additionally, the Communique 
formalized assurances that neither the U.S. nor China would “seek hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific region,” and that, “each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of 
countries to establish such hegemony;” this, in essence, functionally allied both countries 
against the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia.221 From a systems engineering 
perspective, the 1972 Shanghai Communique provided the first agreed-upon declarations 
by which to evaluate the future progress of the U.S.-China relationship. 
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Figure 4.  U.S.-China Foreign Policy Communication after 1972 
Rapprochement 
2. Expanding Foreign Policy Inclusion: Bringing in the Domestic 
Interest 
While the 1972 Shanghai Communique was certainly a shining example of 
successful Track One diplomacy and it helped to connect the broken connections between 
the U.S. and China’s foreign policy systems, as the systems engineering chapter clearly 
showed, domestic feedback is an integral element of foreign policy systems. 
a. The Joint Communique of 1978: Normalization of Diplomatic Relations 
While the Shanghai Communique successfully broke the ice in U.S.-China 
diplomatic relations, a great deal of domestic “national interest finding” was necessary in 
the United States in order for the country as a whole to legally move forward with deeper 
U.S.-China cooperation. In 1972, the U.S. still did not have an embassy in mainland 
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China, and, still at the height of the Cold War, remained deeply divided about the benefits 
of cooperating with a Communist country at the potential cost of Taiwan as an ally. 
Nevertheless, in 1978, the “Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China” 
reaffirmed the Shanghai Communique, and “recognize(d) the Government of the People's 
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China,” very carefully (and cleverly) 
not going so far as to say that Taiwan was a part of that China. This communique also 
formally promised the establishment of embassies in both countries on March 1, 1979.222 
Almost seven years after the signing of the 1972 Communique, the 1978 Communique 
was perhaps even more controversial in that it explicitly formalized the slow withdrawal 
of United States support from the full spectrum of Taiwan's national interests. The 
injustice some perceived after the 1978 Communique would lead to another round of 
domestic feedback and lobbying in the U.S. Congress in order to increase the domestic 
legitimacy of the U.S. foreign policies vis-à-vis both China and Taiwan. 
b. The Taiwan Relations Act: Finding Domestic Balance 
In the aftermath of the 1978 Joint Communique, the U.S. once again looked 
inward for a refinement of its foreign policy toward China and Taiwan; the result of this 
national interest-finding was the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which would clarify that 
there was room in U.S. foreign policy for productive relations with both the PRC and 
Taiwan.223 When President Carter first reluctantly, and controversially,224 announced 
that he would allow Congress to participate in ongoing negotiations with China on the 
continued expansion of U.S.-China relations, Congress' primary goal was to provide 
diplomatic support for the President in achieving the fundamental aims of normalization, 
but the Congress also sought to make the bill more representative of U.S. national 
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interests.225 Thus, when Congress embarked upon the task of drafting the TRA, its 
attention to detail was specifically to make sure that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 
became a strong legal basis for U.S. ties with both the PRC and Taiwan.226 Both U.S. and 
PRC interests when entering into negotiations were clear. The United States' explicit 
demands included: 1. continued unofficial ties with Taiwan, 2. the termination of the 
existing defense treaty with Taiwan, 3. continued sales of weapons to Taiwan, 4. 
continued trade with Taiwan, and 5. assurances that any future efforts toward unification 
between China and Taiwan would be peaceful.227 China, on the other hand, explicitly 
demanded: 1. existing defense treaties with Taiwan be terminated, and 2. a reduction in 
U.S. naval presence.228 The implications and outcomes of this debate process were 
subtle, and ended up satisfying both sides to the highest extent that might have been 
possible at the time.229 For example, China did not favor the complete U.S. withdrawal of 
its forces from Asia, because it still needed U.S. presence to balance against the Soviet 
Union.230 The United States, in turn, gained the legislative approval it needed to move 
full steam ahead in the expansion of diplomatic and economic ties with the PRC. 
The explicit inclusion of a broader base of public approval into the TRA made it a 
stronger representation of U.S. foreign policy toward China. The necessity of this 
domestic feedback process in the U.S. does not exist in the same form in the one-party 
system that rules China,231 but domestic feedback is an integral part of ensuring that U.S. 
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foreign policy is legitimately representative of the full spectrum of interests within the 
United States. Whereas the president of the United States has an electoral and 
Constitutional mandate to execute the foreign policy of the United States, and in most 
cases he can do so unilaterally, the commitments of the United States are strengthened by 
bipartisan support of specific foreign policies, which thereby transforms single-
administration foreign policies into stable, long-term, multi-administration foreign 
policies. In fact, the Congress specifically included provisions in the TRA to ensure that a 
future president could not take any further unilateral action to jeopardize the 
independence of Taiwan.232 The foreign policy stability233 that resulted from this process 
benefitted not only the U.S., but China as well. To be sure, while the U.S. was mired in 
negotiations around the TRA, China was already receiving a bump in its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) from the 1978 agreement.234 The “legal framework” that the TRA 
provided to the U.S., however, was necessary to cement the change in U.S. foreign policy 
toward China,235 and played a foundational role in the growth that would follow. The 
United States and China both benefitted236 from the increased U.S. foreign policy 
explicitness that came as a result of the TRA being turned into U.S. Public Law 96-8. 
c. The Joint Communique of 1982: Three's Company, Four's a Crowd 
In 1982, the third and final communique between the U.S. and China clarified the 
United States' position on arms sales to Taiwan and marked the end of the usefulness of 
communiques as an institution through which to conduct U.S.-China diplomacy. The 
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Joint Communique of 1982, by that point a formality that had taken root in high-level 
exchanges between the U.S. and China, made several small but important U.S. foreign 
policies increasingly explicit. The communique: 1. reaffirmed the tenets of the 1979 Joint 
Communique, 2. clarified that China and the U.S. had never come to an agreement about 
the U.S. supplying defensive arms to Taiwan, 3. reaffirmed the importance of non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, and 4. committed the U.S. to abiding by a 
defensive arms ceiling in its arms sale to Taiwan, as defined by the level of arms sales to 
Taiwan at the beginning of normalized relations between China and the U.S., with a 
further caveat that the U.S. did intend to reduce those sales over time towards a final 
resolution.237 This was the third and final communique because, while the U.S. clearly 
gained and lost some freedom of action by increasing the explicitness of its policies vis-à-
vis arms sales to Taiwan, and the U.S.-China relationship certainly benefitted by 
removing these ambiguities, China felt it had little to gain from further communiques.238 
Though this would prove to be the final “ice-breaker communique” between the U.S. and 
China, the communique as a tool to explicitly communicate foreign policies would be 
replaced by more mature and explicit institutions in the form of the United Nations and 
World Trade Organization. 
3. Summary: In Case of Emergency, Break Ice 
Simply based on the U.S.-China experience in the Korean War and the 
progressive improvement of relations with each successive bilateral agreement, it is clear 
that there may be a correlation between the explicitness with which a state communicates 
its foreign policy objectives and the absence of hard power conflict in its relations with 
other states. There are still too many other co-traveling variables to be able to make such 
an assertion definitively, though, and it is still unclear whether explicitness in itself is an 
inherent good, or if there is such a thing a “bad explicitness,” and whether bad 
explicitness is corrected for systemically. In the sections to follow, I will explore some 
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cases where foreign policy explicitness led to retrenchment and engaged a self-correcting 
foreign policy mechanism. For example, the tendency of U.S. presidents in particular to 
“flip-flop” in their policies toward China is well documented by James Mann.239 
Additionally, we have yet to explore the obviously germane arguments that IR Theory 
has to offer. At this point, however, it is perhaps appropriate at the end of this section to 
quote Henry Kissinger when he describes the most beneficial possible relationship 
between the U.S. and China not as being a “partnership,” but as being a “co-evolution,” 
wherein both countries should “pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where 
possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict.”240 
C. POLITICAL EXPLICITNESS: BUILDING RULES-BASED 
INTERACTIONS IN THE MIDST OF ANARCHY 
With the diplomatic building blocks to allow them to interact with each other 
officially on the world stage thus in place, the U.S. and China began to develop a 
checkered relationship within the confines of the United Nations' rules-based institutions. 
Despite being newer to the organization than the U.S., by moving some of its foreign 
policy communications higher along the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness, China 
has successfully kept some of its domestic and foreign policies inexplicit. Participation in 
the U.N.'s rules-based institutions, though, inevitably leads states to slowly increase the 
explicitness of their policies. When the People's Republic of China joined the United 
Nations in October of 1971, it was not at the behest of the United States;241 however, its 
participation in the international decision-making body has produced numerous positive 
results for the U.S. over the decades of its membership. Over the course of the twenty 
years between 1950 and 1970, the PRC went from being a pariah (to some) in the 
international community to being a fully-vested permanent member of the U.N. Security 
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Council. From a political perspective, China's enmeshment in the U.N. has kept it from 
acting out of turn.242 Samuel Kim asserts that three things in post-Mao Chinese foreign 
policy have changed because of participation in the U.N. and other multilateral 
institutions: 1. China responds in the form of white papers to criticism it receives during 
U.N.-sponsored conferences, 2. China's domestic and international politics have become 
“inevitably linked,” and 3. socialization effects have produced “nontrivial positive” 
policy and behavioral change, like China becoming signatory to the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.243 In short, in order to derive benefit from 
participation in the international community, China is forced to make its foreign policies 
increasingly explicit. This is not to imply, however, that China always acts in concert 
with the U.S. or U.N. interests; to the contrary, China acts in its own national interests at 
the U.N. table, and can be uncooperative at times as well.244 
1. Explicit Distraction: Horse-trading for the Status Quo 
China understands that some of its domestic and foreign policies are distasteful to 
the international community, and in order to maintain its domestic status quo China has 
proven skillful at obfuscating the inexplicitness of some of its policies by increasing its 
explicitness on other policies. In critiquing China's historical role in the U.N., Marc 
Lanteigne notes that China bandwagons (free-rides) when it feels it is in its best interest, 
like in the 2001 war on terror, international trade issues, international law issues, and 
transnational crime.245 Alastair Iain Johnston follows that “China's position as a U.N. 
Security Council veto power allows it to extract international strategic rents for 
acquiescing to actions that the United States would like to undertake multilaterally, like it 
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does in the area of peace-keeping operations.”246 As one example, China was able to 
leverage its position on the U.N. Security Council in 1990 to lift sanctions imposed upon 
it after the Tiananmen Square Massacre by agreeing to bandwagon with President George 
Bush's push to sanction Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.247 The international community can be 
a precarious place for states that have issues they consider to be off-limits to public 
discussion, but China has proven very adept at maintaining low levels of foreign policy 
explicitness on certain issues. In effect, whereas the WTO provides a market within 
which the U.S. and China can barter and trade economic policy, the U.N. provides a 
similar market for bartering in foreign policies. It is only the explicitness of policies that 
allows this to happen, and while political horse-trading is not unique to the U.N., its 
complexity has increased consistently with the increasing complexity of global 
interactions within which states are enmeshed. The existence of such a market also 
highlights the hazards of living in a glass house; whereas China still retains low levels of 
policy explicitness for the time being that it can trade for bilateral progress in 
transparency and increased explicitness, the U.S. bartered away its low levels of foreign 
policy explicitness with the TRA. This fundamentally different approach to societal 
transparency strikes at the core of the ideological differences between the U.S. and China. 
Fundamentally, the U.S. and China have different perspectives on what policy 
issues should be exposed to a United Nation's international relations feedback loop that 
inevitably leads to increased foreign policy explicitness rather than vise-versa. For 
example, China's perspective on the inviolability of domestic policy issues leads it to 
refuse to allow issues of sovereignty to be brought before the U.N.248 Liselotte Odgaard 
highlights the difference in U.S. and Chinese opinions about where explicitness can and 
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cannot be expected. Whereas the U.S. envisions a global liberal democratic order, the 
Chinese seek a future based on coexistence by different domestic political environments 
in an environment that allows for certain levels of non-interference.249 The U.S. tends to 
push integration over coexistence, alliances over the U.N. system, common values 
(ideology) over common interests (economics), and cooperation over coordination.250 In 
a world where reputation and trust are used as a currency by states to purchase influence 
outsider their borders,251 China has purchased freedom of domestic action with 
increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness. This is not necessarily a bad thing; in a 
way it represents the democratic process. Just as intractability happens in U.S. domestic 
politics, it happens in the U.N. as well. The paths around such obstructions, however, 
tend to only reveal themselves when the full spectrum of possible areas for cooperation 
and confidence building are made explicit to all parties involved. In specific reference to 
rapprochement and cooperation, Henry Kissinger emphasized the importance of taking 
advantage of the “opportunity to increase cooperation where interests were congruent and 
to mitigate differences where they existed.”252 From a systems engineering perspective, 
even if near-term foreign policy interests do not align, multiple iterations of a multi-
national foreign policy system with basic levels of explicitness can lead to further 
increases in beneficial foreign policy explicitness. Simply being a contributing member 
of multilateral institutions produces opportunities to cooperate toward common interests. 
A lack of such systemic connections reduces explicitness and thus the opportunities for 
cooperation. International Relations (IR) theorists have different perspectives on the 
utility (or perhaps futility) of such cooperation, though. 
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2. Explicit Cooperation: Realism and Constructivism 
There is room on the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness for both realist and 
constructivist IR theories. As much as the realists would like to consider the stick to be 
the most important factor in influencing the direction of state-to-state interactions, when 
communicated properly, a combination of the carrot, the stick, and explicit declarations 
of foreign policy objectives can form the most effective foreign policies amidst the 
complexity of modern international relations. I reviewed IR theories in search of 
theoretical positions on whether tacit or explicit messaging is more effective at 
facilitating constructive foreign relations. Jack Snyder holds that IR theories help to 
explain the assumptions that exist behind the things that politicians say, and that all 
countries bring theoretical priors to their foreign relations.253 Realists like John 
Mearsheimer believe that no quantity of repeated constructive interaction can prevent 
conflict from eventually arising between rising and hegemon states.254 Realists also tend 
to rely on tacit expressions of relative power through hard power buildup in order to 
passively regulate relations between states, but do not necessarily exclude the use of 
active hard power messaging to achieve desired results. What the realists miss, though, is 
that hard power can be augmented well with explicit, non-hard foreign policy messaging. 
Constructivists like Alexander Wendt, believe that relations can improve through the 
sharing of ideas, provided the context of the interaction is properly focused.255 While 
constructivists do not rule out the usefulness of tacit messaging through hard power 
buildup, their primary relationship-shaping tool is the explicit expression and exchange of 
ideas. Both theories are fundamentally compatible, and differ only in the explicitness 
with which foreign policies are communicated. In this sense, increasing predictability and 
reducing the perception of threat is also a key component of both theories. In describing 
the differences between Mearsheimer, Wendt, and others’ views on U.S.-China relations, 
Aaron Friedberg asserts that while theoretical preconceptions are unavoidable, explicit 
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communication of theoretical priors is key to reducing the perception of threat.256 By 
communicating foreign policies at higher levels of explicitness, states help other states 
reduce confusion about the reasoning behind their actions.257 From a systems engineering 
perspective, increasing foreign policy explicitness allows foreign actors to see more 
transparently into the decision-making process of other states, and thereby better evaluate 
the threat posed by those states. 
The fundamental compatibility of realist and constructivist messaging approaches 
can be seen in a recent article from official Chinese channels describing the new ability 
of Chinese nuclear ballistic missile submarines to attack West Coast U.S. cities.258 In 
realist terms, the tacit buildup of a submarine-based nuclear strike capability should lead 
to an increase in bilateral tensions and a security dilemma. However, the Chinese article 
made explicit the point that the weapons were deployed as a strategic deterrent. This type 
of explicit messaging, whether honest or not, helps to constrain and focus the range of 
interpretations that the U.S. can make about Chinese military intent.259 It also provides 
the U.S. another explicit data point by which to evaluate the how well China’s words and 
actions align. Constructive expressions of foreign policy are inherently stabilizing 
because, at their core, they can signal the intent to cooperate peacefully and demonstrate 
that each side’s policies are fundamentally peaceful, even if those policies are backed 
with hard power. In summary, the delta between what two states desire for their 
relationship and how they both try to achieve their desired objectives can vary widely, 
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but the explicit back-and-forth communication of ideas can help make a traditionally 
inexplicit realist world a little more explicit, predictable, and easier to monitor. 
3. Whether to Agree, Agree to Disagree, or Say Nothing at All? 
While it is unlikely that any simple increase in foreign policy explicitness can 
solve the sovereignty disputes in the South and East China Seas, the explicitly expressed 
desire to maintain economic ties in the region has likely kept the Asia-Pacific stable for 
the time being. Few problems in international relations are more vexing than those that 
deal with sovereignty, and there is certainly no one-size-fits-all solution that can solve 
every type of outstanding sovereignty dispute. There are times when making a state's 
claims as administratively explicit as possible is the best path, which is the approach that 
the Philippines is currently taking in the South China Sea. There are also times when it is 
in a state's best interest to keep its claims administratively ambiguous and inexplicit, 
while at the same time enforcing its claims with military movements, as China is doing in 
the South China Sea. There are even times when the simple act of acknowledging the 
existence of a dispute would be counter-productive, as is the case with Japan and China's 
posturing over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In each case, all participant states are acting 
rationally and in their own best interests given the full range of military and diplomatic 
tools at their disposal, but a solution does not appear imminent in any of the disputes. 
Proposing a solution to these problems is not within the scope of this thesis, but such 
intractable problems are familiar to history. When U.S.-China rapprochement was still 
unthinkable, increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness lit a path forward. Henry 
Kissinger called this process “co-evolution,” and described its three key components 
thus: 1. high level discussions that can mitigate crises, 2. increasingly comprehensive 
issue-focused frameworks, and 3. the creation of a “Pacific Community.”260 The most 
important thing states can focus on, he asserts, is “elaboration” of “shared purposes.”261 
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Indeed, in all the sovereignty cases above, common economic purpose may be the only 
thing that has kept the region from descending into violence. From a systems engineering 
perspective, increasing foreign policy explicitness in one part of the foreign policy 
system also stabilizes other parts of the system as well. In the next section, I explore the 
important stabilizing economic effects of the WTO and other economic institutions, and 
how they likely receive such pacifying power from the contractual explicitness that is an 
inherent aspect of trade agreements. 
D. ECONOMIC EXPLICITNESS: THE WTO AND LENGTHENING THE 
SHADOW OF THE FUTURE THROUGH BETTER CONTRACTING 
Building on their increasing importance to each other, the U.S. and China 
struggled in the 1990s to find a way to more productively interact with each other in light 
of China's behavior during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. Relations between 
the U.S. and China in the WTO have been no less controversial than those in the U.N., 
but the more explicit and contractual nature of WTO agreements has led it to produce 
more absolute progress than the zero-sum political horse-trading that appears to dominate 
U.N. negotiation processes. Economic ties form an integral part of the U.S.-China 
relationship,262 but trade between them has not always been as robust and valuable as it is 
now. After the U.S. restored Most-Favored Nation (MFN) trade status to China in 1979, 
the U.S. gradually reduced trade restrictions until China was a “friendly, non-allied” 
trading partner by 1983.263 At the time, though, China was still not a member of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the premier global trade organization 
during the 1980s and early ’90s. China spent much of the 1990s trying to join the GATT 
and its successor the WTO, but was hampered by reform demands the U.S. imposed as 
prerequisite to China's entry.264 Chief among U.S. demands was the improvement of 
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human rights enforcement in China.265 At times, the restrictions seemed onerous to China 
and unfairly imposed, but the explicitness of the demands made it clear what was 
expected. Thus, despite aggressive demands, China did its best to play along, knowing 
full well that being “in the club” was more important than sitting in time-out.266 China 
made many of the changes that were required, and became a member of the WTO in 
2001. While some concerns still linger, the feedback loop created around explicit U.S. 
foreign policy demands led directly to improvements in China's trade practices before 
and after accession into the WTO. 
Since 2001, U.S.-China interactions within the confines of the WTO have largely 
been productive, and issues that have arisen have mostly been resolved through the rules-
based functions of the WTO.267 Because of how enmeshed both the U.S. and China are in 
the global economy, both states realize that they must be a part of the system without 
disrupting it.268 Samuel Kim asserts that multilateral economic institutions (MEIs) have 
socialized China to the demands of participation in the global economy.269 John 
Ravenhill conducted an analysis of data from the first four years after China's entry into 
the WTO and determined that China's participation had largely produced benign 
economic effects.270 Wu Xinbo asserts that the WTO is helping improve relations 
between the U.S. and China because it acts as a soft balancing proxy between the two.271 
While these things sound nice, Chinese intransigence at the WTO takes many forms. 
At times China breaks rules it has explicitly agreed to, and at times it avoids 
enmeshing itself in WTO organizations that would limit its freedom of action. As an 
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example of the former issue, despite agreeing to not force technology transfer on foreign 
firms as a prerequisite to doing business in China when it joined the WTO in 2001, it is 
still a common practice in China.272 As an example of the latter, China has avoided 
participating in the establishment of explicit norms for operating in cyberspace, despite 
the need for them.273 Additionally, China is not party to the WTO's Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA), which the United States wants China to join because it 
will force China to report its government spending and help to formally monitor China's 
state involvement in its economy.274 The U.S. response to China's intransigence at the 
WTO has not been without controversy either. For example, the U.S. has attempted to 
influence Chinese currency policies by passing domestic legislation that compels China 
through trade restrictions, which some U.S. policy-makers contend is a violation of WTO 
obligations.275 Despite the complexity of all these issues, though, the forced policy 
explicitness that has accompanied China's participation in the WTO276 has mostly had 
positive effects.277 By both states being party to the WTO, the U.S. and China can bring 
formal disputes against each other. In fact, 9 of 14 disputes raised by the U.S. toward 
China have been satisfactorily resolved.278 These are issues that might not have been 
resolved outside of the explicit demands of the WTO framework. Thus, despite a few 
persistent difficulties, the foreign policy explicitness mandated by participation in rules-
based organizations like the WTO has increased the mutual benefit of U.S.-China 
relations by moving the relationship further to the right along the foreign policy 
explicitness spectrum. From a systems engineering perspective, the positive meshing of 
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the economic interests of a wide swath of domestic actors in both the U.S. and China has 
also iterated the foreign policy systems in both countries toward a system that can stably 
sustain those domestic interests. 
E. TAKING A FIX: WHERE ON THE SPECTRUM OF FOREIGN POLICY 
EXPLICITNESS U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS NOW STAND 
After decades of increasingly explicit interactions through a variety of 
institutions, U.S.-China relations are now at a much more stable place than they were in 
1972, and new institutions are in place to continue this progress. As institutions, the three 
U.S.-China Communiques, the TRA, the U.N., and the WTO have all either served their 
purpose or matured. Now, the development of more modern foreign policy explicitness 
trade institutions in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) is evidence of a continued drive by both countries toward the 
codification of increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness. The dangers of failing to 
continue to make progress became apparent when, in November of 2013, without notice 
China unilaterally announced a brand new Air Defense Interrogation Zone (ADIZ) and 
started enforcing it. Inevitably, in response to the inexplicit means by which the Chinese 
communicated their new foreign policy, the U.S. was forced to respond by sending two 
B-52 bombers through the new ADIZ, marking “the most worrying strategic escalation 
between the two countries since 1996, when China’s then president, Jiang Zemin, ordered 
a number of exclusion zones for missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, leading America to 
send two aircraft-carriers there.”279 The stakes are high in U.S.-China relations; it is 
important to look holistically at where U.S. foreign policy toward China is currently 
written down, and how the S&ED and TPP are influencing the direction of the 
relationship. 
                                                 
279 The Economist, “China's New Air-Defence Zone Suggests a Worrying New Approach in the 
Region,” The Economist, last modified: 2013, last accessed: 2013-12-03, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590930-chinas-new-air-defence-zone-suggests-worrying-new-
approach-region-face. Also see Agence France-Presse, “US, Chinese warships nearly collide in South 
China Sea,” Channel News Asia, last modified: 2013, last accessed: 2013-12-15, 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/us-chinese-warships/922122.html for a more recent run-
in between U.S. and Chinese warships. 
 87
1. Inexplicitness through Inaccessibility: Where are Foreign Policies 
Written Down? 
U.S. foreign policies toward China are not consolidated in any single place, and it 
is unclear whether China even knows what the United States' foreign policies toward 
China are. Within the U.S., a common maxim is that “transparency improves government 
accountability.”280 This section touches on a subject that is discussed in greater depth in 
other parts of this thesis, but authoritative domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy toward 
China are surprisingly difficult to find. The most explicit, formal policy agreements and 
legislation that constrain U.S. actions toward China are spread widely across official 
documents from the U.N., WTO, and U.S. Congressional Legislation. Inexplicit and 
informal policy declarations, like those made verbally by U.S. leaders through various 
media outlets, are even more difficult to consolidate. A recent Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report determined that only seven pieces of legislation form the backbone 
of the United States' foreign policy toward China.281 As such, it appears there is very 
little explicit direction by which the U.S. holds itself accountable in its foreign policy 
activity toward China.282 To be sure, formalized agreements in the WTO and U.N. allow 
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both the U.S. and other countries to hold the U.S. accountable for its foreign policies, but 
nowhere are all U.S. obligations vis-à-vis its relationship with China, both formal and 
informal, consolidated in a single and easily accessible place. While transparency has 
long been an ideological mainstay in U.S. domestic politics, transparency is missing in 
U.S. foreign policy because of its inaccessibility; in an increasingly connected digital 
world, inaccessibility is perceived as being equivalent to opacity.283 In the recently 
published “Open Government Partnership: Second Open Government National Action 
Plan for The United States of America,” the White House states that it views the broader 
American public as a “strategic partner” capable of contributing constructively to 
solutions on America's hardest problems, and making best-practice metrics available is an 
integral part of this effort.284 Indeed, the focus of performance.gov is to improve the 
linkage between national goals and the metrics used to measure the performance of 
government.285 By not consolidating its foreign policies in a single place, it is difficult to 
tell what the United States' “national goals” with regard to China are. For this reason, 
U.S. foreign policies toward China remain lower on the spectrum of foreign policy 
explicitness than they could be. 
China is no less administratively inaccessible, especially from outside the 
Communist Party of China. While Wayne Morrison notes that China's Five-Year Plans 
(FYP) provide broad policy transparency and explicitness such that the whole of 
government and civilian actors can coordinate activity toward common goals,286 Shirley 
Kan highlights the frustration that U.S. actors feel toward China. Specifically, the U.S. 
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stresses the lack of Chinese foreign policy transparency when it comes to the intent of 
China's military development; speaking about China on June 13th of 2007, Secretary of 
Defense Richard Lawless testified to the House Armed Services Committee that “in the 
absence of adequate explanation for capabilities which are growing dynamically, both in 
terms of pace and scope, we are put in the position of having to assume the most 
dangerous intent a capability offers.”287 China, on the other hand, uses political warfare 
as a coercive tool,288 and is unwilling to increase the transparency of its military 
development without first developing deeper levels of trust toward the U.S. This reality 
strikes at conundrum in U.S.-China relations that can only be solved by increased foreign 
policy explicitness: whereas the U.S. sees transparency as a necessary pre-requisite for 
trust, but China sees trust as a necessary pre-requisite for transparency.289 The Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are efforts to 
toward finding solutions to this conundrum, and both involve increasing explicitness in 
both strategic and economic foreign policies. 
2. The S&ED: Recognizing the Importance of Strategic Explicitness 
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is an attempt to push 
beyond economic improvements and reach a new level of strategic foreign policy 
explicitness between the U.S. and China; it remains an ambitious and potentially valuable 
institution, but its implementation has thus far seen mixed success.290 Thanks to the 
WTO and countless other bi- and multi-lateral trade agreements, global economic policy 
explicitness has been continually increasing for the last few decades. As a follow-on to 
the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) that was established in 1983 as an 
economic policy discussion forum for the U.S. and China, the S&ED was established in 
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2009 to increase the scope of the JCCT's agenda to include strategic issues as well.291 
While the existence of the S&ED as a forum for discussion is a positive development that 
allows both sides to explicitly express their positions on a wide range of issues, its 
implementation has thus far not been without its flaws. As Wayne Morrison notes, the 
S&ED has thus far produced few concrete results, become overrun with ceremony, 
remains too focused on short-term deliverables, and lacks solid metrics.292 Similarly, the 
GAO notes that though a multitude of potentially positive agreements have come out of 
the S&ED, “no single document is used to track implementation,” and while both the 
U.S. and China have been called upon to identify metrics, neither has done so.293 The 
primary output product of the S&ED is a “fact sheet” which both parties are expected to 
implement that contains a list of “cooperative activities.” On the U.S. side, this fact sheet 
is apparently never made public, despite its existence within the full scope of U.S. foreign 
policy.294 Naturally, some level of diplomatic secrecy is germane to high-level strategic 
discussions, as was apparent in the initial stages of U.S.-China rapprochement, but 
complete opacity prevents participatory and collaborative public action along multiple 
diplomatic tracks. Without public exposure, accountability and action on specific 
deliverables is less likely to lead to actual resource allocation.295 Within reason, both the 
U.S. and China need to improve the transparency of the foreign policy agreements that 
come out of the S&ED. 
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3. The TPP: Augmenting the WTO with a New Rules-Based Trade 
Agreement 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a broad, multi-lateral trade agreement that 
attempts to bring rules-based interactions to a new range of trade activities that have 
previously gone unregulated and proven resistant to increased explicitness within the 
WTO. For a country like the U.S., which happens to be the most ardent advocate of the 
TPP, increased transparency and explicitness across the full spectrum of foreign trade 
policy issues is an attractive deal. For China, which would likely suffer in the near term 
while domestically implementing sweeping trade restrictions, participation in the TPP 
will take some convincing; however, similar to how the lack of explicitness in S&ED is 
preventing collective action in the areas of accountability and metric-creation, the U.S. 
struggles to change China's mind about its trade policies because it lacks the metrics to 
show that it would be in China's best interest to do things like allow its currency to 
appreciate and improve intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement.296 That being 
said, China is not averse to joining the TPP, as long as it does so at an “appropriate time” 
and of its “own accord.”297 Perhaps China's openness to participation in TPP talks may 
surprise some, but China's historical preference for trade communities is likely based on 
its preference for contract-based agreements over carte-blanche security treaties; China 
has tended to resist the idea that it might be beholden outside of its perceived contractual 
bounds to do things at the behest of a partner.298 Provided the ice can be broken in the 
right way, the TPP represents an attractive opportunity for cooperation to both the U.S. 
and China.299 
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4. Chinese Nationalism: Balancing Legitimacy with Transparency 
While it is clear that the U.S. has a few areas where it can domestically improve 
its foreign policy system, China’s challenges in increasing the explicitness of its foreign 
policy system are far more complex. Chinese nationalism cannot be ignored in any 
discussion of increasing transparency and foreign policy explicitness in China.300 There 
are legitimate Chinese concerns about the complexities of opening up Chinese foreign 
policy to public opinion when the system has been so closed for so long. In China, 
whereas smaller groups of leaders make pragmatic decisions, large groups tend to 
become nationalistic and make irrational decisions.301 Chinese leaders most fear multiple 
discontented classes in China finding common ground and rising up against the 
government's legitimacy.302 As multiple anti-Japanese protests in recent memory can 
attest to, the long history of the CCP’s artificial inflation of Chinese nationalism can 
sometimes operate counter to Chinese national interests.303 There is evidence that the 
Chinese government is trying to pragmatically break free of the bonds of this self-
imposed nationalism, though. For example, Susan Shirk sees the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three as a backdoor financial infrastructure that China and 
Japan use to circumvent nationalist anti-Japan or anti-China sentiments.304 Suisheng 
Zhao asserts that even though nationalist voices are louder than ever, the CCP does a 
good job of filtering those voices into pragmatic policy; after all, the quest for wealth 
makes all Chinese pragmatic, both its citizens and leaders.305 From a strategic 
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perspective, Chinese leaders were very pragmatic in accepting Colin Powell's “very 
sorry” apology in the wake of EP-3 incident in April of 2001.306 Provided the upsides are 
made explicit enough, the potential for pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy is clear. 
In light of the apparent ability for the CCP to pragmatically manage the execution 
side of its foreign policies outside its own borders, the question of how China could 
increase domestic participation in its foreign policy system is an important one. 
Managing public opinion and preventing a coup attempt against the legitimacy of the 
Chinese government is one thing, taking the opinions of one's citizenry into account 
when crafting foreign policy, as the U.S. was forced to do in the creation of the TRA, 
brings an entirely different set of challenges. As an example, the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), the equivalent of the U.S. Department of State, is decidedly 
missing a domestic feedback loop. Though the MFA stares out at the world and 
broadcasts internally to domestic audiences, no Chinese institution exists to listen for 
helpful domestic opinions on Chinese Foreign Policy. Some have suggested the reason 
for this is that because all domestic communication is along the party-line, no opinion not 
already corrupted by the CCP party line could possibly come back.307 A potential in-
route from the public to government foreign policy decision-makers has developed lately 
in the form of academic institutions and foreign policy think tanks. Pascal Abb explored 
the world of Chinese think tanks and evaluated them based on how academic they are, 
how focused they are on advising government, and how interested they are in public 
relations. Most Chinese think tanks appear to shun the lime light, and their internally 
opaque processes make it difficult to understand how they influence government, but 
Chinese think tanks are receiving increasing media visibility and are absorbing the lion's 
share of the Chinese public's increasing interest in foreign policy issues. This public 
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window into the words that shape Chinese foreign policy seems to provide hope at 
increased transparency in the future. 
In summary, Chinese foreign policy is no longer a completely black box, but 
China has a lot of potentially productive space in which to expand the explicitness of its 
foreign policies to levels more commensurate and compatible with that to be found 
within the United States and other great powers. From a systems engineering perspective, 
progressive increases in the explicitness of Chinese foreign policy have improved the 
transparency with which the U.S. and other countries can evaluate Chinese interactions 
with the world outside its borders, thereby improving the effectiveness with which they 
can interact with China’s foreign policy systems. 
 
Figure 5.  U.S.-China Foreign Policy Communication under Present Conditions 
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F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has travelled over a great deal of space and time, but its message is 
simple and is congruent to the results of my systems engineering analysis: increasing the 
explicitness of foreign policies produces positive results in both domestic and foreign 
affairs, and lays a foundation for increasing levels of cooperation. Increasing levels of 
explicitness broke through the post-Korean War diplomatic ice and created the 
foundation for U.S.-China rapprochement and all the economic and geo-strategic benefits 
that have followed. Institutions like the U.N., WTO, S&ED, and TPP have all contributed 
positively since then, and as I have shown, the source of that institutional progress rests 
on a backbone of increased foreign policy explicitness. In a sense, such systems are both 
democratic and meritocratic, ensuring that only the most mutually-productive and 
stabilizing foreign policies persist through repeated rounds of open negotiations. Bi- and 
multi-lateral agreements that consist of individual, explicit line item agreements are easy 
for a broad base of concerned constituents to monitor, and make it difficult to hide non-
compliance and defection;308 this is especially true if the metrics and means by which to 
evaluate performance are also explicitly defined and universally accessible.309 Since it 
appears unlikely that a common political or economic system can bring all of Asia 
together, explicit ideas in the form of foreign policies have to foot the bill. 
Looking back at the systems engineering chapter, it is possible to see how all of 
the elements that comprise an effective foreign policy system have been explored within 
the empirical context of the U.S.-China relationship: 1. the development of domestic 
legitimacy for specific policies, 2. the implementation of policies in ways that fall 
somewhere along the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness, and 3. monitoring the 
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external environment for feedback. As the systems engineering chapter showed, the 
currency that flows through the foreign policy system, as built up by domestic legitimacy 
and discharged by implementation, is Trust (T), and when T is maximized, foreign 
policies are at their most effective. In the next chapter, I examined the U.S. foreign policy 
system in order to better understand the current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. 
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IV. THE EVOLVING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 
While the previous chapters have made it clear in numerous ways that increasing 
foreign policy explicitness has a net positive effect on foreign policy systems, this is not 
an entirely new concept. In many ways, transformations in the U.S. foreign policy system 
that increase the explicitness of foreign policy exchange are already underway. These 
changes are sometimes subtle, but in aggregate they represent a significant new approach 
to foreign policy execution. For example, within the last decade the U.S. Navy has 
dramatically revitalized its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community. Additionally, the 
diplomatic connections between the U.S. and China have expanded to the point where 
three robust diplomatic tracks are helping to stabilize the relationship. Perhaps most 
important, though, is the increasing recognition within many governments that metrics 
play a critical role in evaluating the effectiveness of policy implementation. Alone, each 
of these three developments would be significant; together, they represent a revolution in 
the field of foreign policy. 
A. FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS: IMPROVING FOREIGN POLICY 
EXPLICITNESS AND EXCHANGE 
As an epistemic community, Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) across all four 
military services in the DOD and their Foreign Service Officer (FSO) brethren in the 
DOS represent key components of the executive arm of the U.S. foreign policy system. 
FAOs and FSOs sit at an important nexus between civilian, military, and international 
communities.310 Fundamentally, the FAO converts tacit knowledge from both sides of a 
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foreign policy exchange between two countries into explicit knowledge that can be 
understood by both sides.311 
I reviewed literature on the strategic value of FAOs in order to validate one of the 
many ways that the U.S. appears to perceive value in increasing the explicitness of its 
foreign policy messaging toward China. In improving the relationship between the U.S. 
and China, FAOs are an example of the arbiter at the tactical end of the foreign policy 
execution chain that closes the edges of the foreign policy messaging feedback loop. The 
Institute for Defense Analyses recently conducted a study on “The Strategic Value of 
Foreign Area Officers” and came to the same conclusion about the strategic value added 
by FAOs.312 Amongst the other useful functions they perform, FAOs are local experts 
that execute foreign policy, and provide feedback on needed changes and new metrics at 
the critical outer edges of the national foreign policy network.313 FAOs are integral to the 
continued improvement of relations between the U.S. and China because they increase 
the explicitness of U.S. foreign policies and help to convey Chinese foreign policies back 
to the U.S. in more explicit ways as well. From a systems engineering perspective, FAOs 
improve the quality of the connections in the feedback loop between U.S. and Chinese 
foreign policy systems in order to preclude misunderstanding and miscalculation. 
The roots of the functional role that FAOs play extend into the domestic side of 
the U.S. foreign policy system as well. Since the days of General Eisenhower and 
President Roosevelt, DOS political advisors (POLADs) have provided the official 
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mouthpiece for State Department advice to senior military and political leaders.314 There 
are currently 90 FSOs serving as POLADs within the DOD, and there is a demand signal 
for more.315 POLAD FSOs provide bureaucratic enmeshment, and a formalized linkage 
between DOS, DOD, and the embassy country team at all levels of the chain of 
command.316 Indeed, some of the most interesting and productive exchanges between 
POLADs and members of the military have been at the very junior, O-1 to O-2 level, the 
very edges of DOS and DOD interaction.317 Taken in aggregate, FAOs and FSOs form a 
single community of regional experts that bridge the old gaps between the traditionally 
stove-piped communities of the DOS, DOD, and foreign military and diplomatic 
institutions. They facilitate interaction because, at a very granular and local level, they 
communicate explicit policies back and forth between nodes in disparate foreign policy 
systems. 
There is room to improve the functionality of the FSO and FAO programs by 
improving the coordination of their efforts as a community of regional experts. In the 
past, such cross-disciplinary communities of interest have been referred to as “epistemic 
communities,” which is an apt description of the joint FAO and FSO community. Mai’a 
David Cross recently published a retrospective on the topic. Epistemic communities are 
communities of experts that can advise professionally and authoritatively on policy-
relevant issues,318 and are growing in importance because of internationalization and the 
increasing complexity of transnational issues.319 Though traditionally confined to civilian 
academic institutions, epistemic communities don't necessarily need to be confined only 
to the academic realm; they can be formed within communities of diplomats, judges, and 
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members of the military as well.320 Mai’a Cross notes that “specific groups of high-
ranking military officials who interact transnationally have the potential to form 
epistemic communities by virtue of their shared professional norms and expertise, as long 
as they seek collective policy goals as a result of these qualities.”321 While it is clear that 
the potential exists to create a joint FAO and FSO epistemic community, it still remains 
difficult to unify the work of both career tracks without a common set of foreign policies 
by which to facilitate cohesive discussion. 
In order to build a more cohesive epistemic community amongst FAOs, FSOs and 
the broader foreign policy executive community, the U.S. government needs to define a 
common set of foreign policies from which both the DOS and DOD define and 
coordinate their missions. The development and growth of the FAO and FSO 
communities is a direct result of the institutional understanding that foreign policies need 
to be communicated more explicitly. Increased foreign policy explicitness at the whole-
of-government level can not only help the FAO and FSO communities be more effective, 
it can also help to solidify both communities into a more cohesive team as well. 
B. FOREIGN POLICY HARMONIZATION: FUSING THE THREE 
DIPLOMATIC TRACKS 
Increased foreign policy explicitness can improve the coordination of foreign 
policy activity across all three diplomatic tracks.322 While traditionally foreign diplomacy 
has taken place primarily at the Track One level, like that which broke the ice between 
the U.S. and China in 1972,323 there is room for greater collaboration between the three 
diplomatic tracks. I reviewed literature on the different tracks of diplomacy in order to 
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understand how the explicitness of the foreign policy interactions between states at 
different levels affects the overall relationship between those states. In 1981, William 
Davidson and Joseph Montville grouped national policy interactions between states into 
two “tracks.” Track One diplomacy consists of official state-to-state interactions. Track 
Two diplomacy consists of unofficial contacts between academics or NGOs in two states 
that seek to improve bilateral relations.324 Though these two tracks are useful in 
explaining constructive interactions by informed actors that are aware of each state’s 
policy stances, they do not incorporate the grass-roots interactions of businesses, drunken 
fishermen, tourists, or angry rioters that can also have a big impact on relations between 
two states like the U.S. and China. Diana Chigas groups these uninformed, grass-roots 
actors into a third track.325 The importance of all three tracks on the overall bilateral 
relationship between two states lies in how explicitly states communicate the full 
complexity of their foreign policies to all three tracks on both sides of an international 
relationship.326 For example, whereas Track One and Track Two actors may be in 
agreement that continued Sino-Japanese trade is important, Track Three Chinese citizens 
that are in receipt of mixed Chinese government domestic messaging have proven 
capable of acting counter to the national interest by rioting and senselessly destroying 
Japanese businesses.327 
Naturally, this also plays out in the way that U.S. and China interact with each 
other on a variety of levels. Jeffrey Bader shows that Chinese provocations by their direct 
representatives, be they the Foreign Minister or a drunken fisherman, have harmful 
effects on China's image; China forced to publicly defend its image, but also tends to 
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slowly back away from its more brazen diplomatic missteps.328 China’s recent policy 
emphasis on a “new type of great power relationship”329 is an excellent example of a 
foreign policy that attempts to merge all three tracks toward agreement: the CCP needs 
continued legitimacy, and citizens want the freedom to do business. Some, like John 
Mearsheimer, see China's focus on the “new type of great power relationship” as an 
intentional distraction from military buildup, but more fundamentally the policy shift is 
likely just an explicit attempt to preclude the type of conflict that typically occurs 
between rising and hegemon powers. 
The U.S. is not immune to uncoordinated messaging. In the U.S., disparate Track 
One messaging over the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea prevents all three 
diplomatic tracks from acting in harmony.330 On the other hand, though, explicit and 
coordinated messaging like Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” policy has found 
resonance and consensus across all three tracks.331 In aggregate, the U.S. has honed an 
admirably subtle but deft hand at executing foreign policy across the full array of three-
track diplomacy, but there is certainly still room for growth. 
In summary, the domestic unity of messaging and action between all three tracks 
of diplomacy has a direct effect on how constructively two states can interact. 
Accordingly, it is clear that three-track consensus may also improve the effectiveness 
with which a state can implement and communicate its policies. From a systems 
engineering perspective, the key to this improvement is the increase of foreign policy 
explicitness that can enable such three-track coordination of effort. 
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C. FOREIGN POLICY FEEDBACK: FOSTERING A CULTURE OF 
MEASUREMENT AND SHARING 
In order to validate the effectiveness of foreign policies, one must establish 
metrics by which to observe change within the foreign policy system, and provide the 
general international public full and easy access to the resulting datasets.332 This idea is 
no longer a novel one within the foreign policy system or U.S. Executive Branch.333 In 
recent years, the DOS has taken very interesting steps toward improving its metrics. To 
continue making progress at the whole of government level, though, these same best 
practices must be established from the top of the Executive Department and spread 
downward throughout the entirety of the foreign policy system. Indeed, this process is in 
progress, but should be reinforced. 
1. Metric Creation: Measuring to Improve 
A common maxim is that one can only improve what one can measure,334 but 
oftentimes the qualitative realities of the foreign policy system defy quantitative 
measurement; this is not entirely insurmountable. I searched for existing literature on 
quantitatively measuring foreign policy effectiveness in order to understand how to 
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quantitatively validate whether explicit foreign policies are better than tacit ones. With 
the foreign policy systems infrastructure described above, I have shown that it is 
theoretically possible to quantitatively validate whether increased foreign policy 
explicitness has been a causal or at least correlate-able335 factor in the steady 
improvement in relations between the U.S. and China. Though the development of 
algorithms and actual measurement are beyond the scope of this thesis, general interest in 
the quantification of foreign policy effectiveness is growing and the field is not without 
its priors. 
In 2010, the DOS commissioned a study to create a framework to measure the 
effectiveness of its foreign diplomacy. In response, the University of Texas at Austin 
(UTA) created a framework called the Public Diplomacy Model for the Assessment of 
Performance (PD-MAP) that attempted to merge all DOS foreign diplomacy analytics so 
that DOS can better adapt336 itself and make decisions in a global information 
environment.337 While I have not used this framework directly in this thesis, an important 
contribution of the UTA study was to show that foreign policy metrics need to be 
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systemically tied to the foreign policies they measure.338 My own conclusions appear to 
be consistent UTA’s concepts. For example, since the DOS desires the ability to adapt its 
foreign policies and messaging toward China based on the wide variety of feedback it 
receives from social networks and internet traffic, UTA designed a system of unique 
identifiers that allows those metrics to be associated directly with the foreign policies 
they measure, allowing the DoS to dynamically analyze the changes in its relationship 
with China. This focus was echoed in the recent DOS Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review (QDDR).339 The DOS wishes to use “data-driven crisis 
forecasting” in order to “measure the effectiveness of our civilian responders and 
implementing partners.” As they have been proposed, systemic concepts like PD-MAP 
have the potential to allow organizations like DOS to accomplish such lofty goals, and I 
concur with their approach;340 however, increasing the explicitness of U.S. foreign 
policies at the national level is a key first step to implementing such systems effectively. 
2. Policies First: Making the Horse Pull the Cart 
Many organizations within the U.S. government are beginning to develop metrics 
at the policy level in order to monitor the overall health of their systems. Doing so is 
important. Henry Kissinger links many historical foreign policy failures to U.S. policy-
makers not clearly defining objectives, the preferable means to achieve those objectives, 
and following up with the public to ensure they are willing to pay the resources necessary 
to achieve the objectives over the necessary time span.341 A recent DOS report made an 
admirable attempt at doing this. The report breaks the overall DOS mission down into 
key policies like “achieving peace and security” and into further sub-categories like 
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“transnational crime.”342 Building upon that, the report then makes it clear that within 
“achieving peace and security,” there are 29 indicators that make up DOS and U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) performance ratings, which helps to 
further identify whether those indicators are “above target,” or “improved, but target not 
met,” et cetera.343 As another positive example, the White House Office of the 
Management and Budget (OMB) asked all Executive Departments to identify high-
priority performance goals (HPPGs) as part of the President's performance agenda 
development process.344 The best example of an implementation of such metrics that I 
have found can be seen at Performance.gov, a U.S. government website that provides 
clear “Priority Goals” and assigns metrics to track their progress.345 All of these 
examples are very exciting developments; the focus of top U.S. foreign policy makers 
should be to craft a strong foundation for the foreign policy system and allow its 
participants to innovate. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Through its increased focus on improving FAO programs, multi-track diplomacy, 
and quantitative analysis of the foreign policy system, the United States is definitely 
moving in the right direction by continuing to improve its foreign policy system. These 
efforts are also clear evidence that the U.S. has intuitively learned the importance of 
foreign explicitness and is seeking more of it. In the next and final chapter, I will provide 
some key takeaways, make a few recommendations on how to better focus future foreign 
policy developments, and conclude this thesis. 
                                                 
342 Clinton, A Citizen's Guide to Foreign, 3. 
343 Ibid., 4. Of note, “achieving peace and security” does not appear to be fundamentally incompatible 
with “build security globally.” It would perhaps be helpful to coalesce both policies into a single foreign 
policy in order to remove ambiguity or redundancy. 
344 Clinton, A Citizen's Guide to Foreign, 5. 
345 United States government, “Using Goals to Improve Performance and Accountability,” 
Performance.gov, accessed Dec. 16, 2013, http://goals.performance.gov/goals_2013. 
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V. KEY TAKEAWAYS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
CONCLUSION 
Based on my findings from the systems engineering analysis foreign policy 
systems in Chapter II, the empirical analysis of the role of foreign policy explicitness 
within the context of U.S.-China relations in Chapter III, and the real-world examples 
provided in Chapter IV, I have crafted a few specific steps by which states can improve 
the explicitness of their foreign policies, and thereby improve the stability and 
effectiveness of their relations with other states. These recommendations are targeted at 
senior U.S. government officials in particular, but are likely germane to other state 
governments as well. 
A. TAKEAWAYS 
If there could be only one key takeaway from this thesis, it would be that those 
empowered to officially define foreign policies within states should consider the potential 
benefits of explicitly codifying the entire body of their state's foreign policies in a public 
and digitally accessible way, and encourage other states to follow suit. Such a system, 
properly engineered and managed, could dramatically stabilize relations between states in 
the same way that U.S.-China relations have greatly stabilized since their low point in the 
Korean War. Foreign policies set the tone for how states should engage with “foreign 
nations and sets standards of interaction for its organizations, corporations and individual 
citizens.”346 As most states' foreign policy systems exist today, it is difficult to tell what 
any given state's foreign policies are on particular issues or toward particular partner 
states. Foreign policies change at every press conference, and with every subtle 
interpretation of every official statement. At present, perhaps only a President really 
knows what their state's foreign policies are. It seems unlikely that this state of ambiguity 
is sustainable in a world that demands ever higher levels of transparency and 
                                                 
346 Wikimedia Foundation, “Foreign policy of the United States,” Wikipedia, accessed Feb. 15, 2014, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States. The Wikipedia reference is used here 
not as an authoritative source on foreign relations, but simply because I liked the quote. 
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efficiency.347 There are at least a few concrete steps that leaders in the U.S. can take 
toward increasing the explicitness of their foreign policies. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
What follows is a curated list of specific actions that various organizations within 
states can take to improve the explicitness and functioning of their foreign policy 
systems. Though these recommendations are targeted specifically at the U.S. government, 
they have broad applicability to any state interested in improving the effectiveness of 
their foreign policies. 
1. Modular and Unique: Codify all Foreign Policies  
The U.S. Executive Branch should identify and make explicit every major U.S. 
foreign policy. All non-secret U.S. foreign policy positions should be consolidated and 
written down in a single, publicly and digitally accessible place, and updated as necessary 
to reflect the changing realities of U.S. positions toward foreign entities.348 Codifying all 
of U.S. foreign policy is likely not as daunting a task as it sounds. U.S. foreign policy 
currently exists scattered throughout multiple treaties and signed Executive Agreements. 
The first step to consolidating U.S. foreign policy into one place is pulling all of these 
existing explicit foreign policies into a single place. The next step is to fill in the gaps. 
The final step is to ensure that any future U.S. foreign policy developments are codified 
and inserted into or updated within the context of the same framework. It is my opinion 
that, if the U.S. establishes a single authoritative source for U.S. foreign policy, “they will 
come,” so to speak.349 A “Foreign Policy Explicitness Task Force” could be established 
                                                 
347 See Bill McCollum and Matthew Broaddus, Leader-Imposed Stress (Small Wars Journal, 2013), 7 
for how a lack of rules in a military environment can be “distressful,” rather than “eustressful.” 
348 It is worthwhile to note that, per Thomas Waldhauser, Joint Doctrine Note 2-13: Commander's 
Communication Synchronization (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2013), III-13, the DOS 
INFOCENTRAL provides a centralized place for senior leaders to see “blessed” strategic messages, but it 
is hidden behind a login. In a separate vein, the creation of a consolidated organizational framework of 
unique identifiers for all past and future foreign policies is not so hard as it sounds; consider Ethereum 
Group, “Ethereum,” Ethereum, last modified: 2014, last accessed: 2014-02-15, http://www.ethereum.org/ 
for a recent attempt called “Ethereum” at creating such a system capable of uniquely categorizing disparate 
types of data into a single consolidated framework. 
349 Yes, a cheesy reference to “Field of Dreams.” If you have not seen it, go watch it. 
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for this purpose. The net, long-term result of this process will be a USG that operates and 
adapts faster to changing global realities than the competition.350 
2. Smaller Semantic Pieces: Improve the Publication Format of Official 
Government Documents 
The existing method of publishing official U.S. government documents in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) format is inhibiting the ability for specific government 
policies and directives to grow digitally into an internally cohesive network.351 Rather 
than managing “documents,” individuals should be managing pieces of information on a 
shared platform, an information-centric approach that allows individual pieces of 
information to be tagged, mashed up, secured, and reused in a variety of ways.352 The 
                                                 
350 For a discussion of the importance of bureaucratic speed, see Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A 
Practical Guide,” Strategic Studies Institute 36, no. 1 (2006), 97. Though mentioned originally in reference 
to the concept of “Net Assessment,” the concept is germane within the context of this thesis because the 
U.S. has a chance to dramatically change its bureaucratic dynamics in a way that makes it fundamentally 
more competitive than any other nation, and puts it years ahead of other nations being able to undertake 
nation-scale unified action. 
351 This is beginning to improve, but there is still a lot of work to be done. See Zachary Bastian, “The 
Power of Hackathons: A Roadmap for Sustainable Open Innovation,” The Wilson Center 3, no. 1 (2013), 5 
for how the use of innovative hackathons focused on solving government-specific problems in innovative 
ways requires the government to open its data to the public in an easily consumed, web-ready way. See The 
Executive Office of the President of the United States, “Common Core Metadata Schema,” Github, last 
modified: 2014, last accessed: 2013-08-10, http://project-open-data.github.io/schema/ for how the Common 
Core Metadata Schema is attempting to solve the problem, and see Barack Obama, Executive Order -- 
Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for Government Information (Washington, DC: 
Whitehouse.gov, 2013), and White House, Open Data Policy: Managing Information as an Asset 
(Washington, DC: Whitehouse.gov, 2014), and Peter Orszag, Open Government Directive (Washington, 
DC: Whitehouse.gov, 2009) for official government publications on the subject. See O'Reilly Radar, 
“OpenGov Foundation Open Sources House Oversight's Crowdsourced Legislation Platform,” O'Reilly 
Radar, accessed Oct. 20, 2013, http://oreillyradar.tumblr.com/post/31407101909/opengov-foundation-
open-sources-house-oversights and Nick Judd, “A New Tool to Crowdsource Legislative Markup Comes 
From the U.S. House,” Tech President, last modified: 2011, last accessed: 2013-10-20, 
http://techpresident.com/blog-entry/new-tool-crowdsource-legislative-markup-comes-us-house for the 
recent move to crowdsource legislation markup. See National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Washington, DC: National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2014), 1 for an example of a framework that successfully establishes a set of 
guidelines and common practices in order to consolidate domestic and government efforts. 
352 White House, Digital Government: Building a 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the American 
People (Washington, DC: White House, 2014), 5. Also see Yejun Wu, “Strengthening Intelligence 
Education with Information-Processing and Knowledge-Organization Competencies,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 6, no. 3 (Fall) (2013), 20 for how existing IC metric analysis tools don't have the right digital 
resolution to support the IC decision-making process properly; they are document libraries, when they need 
to be Knowledge-Organizing Systems (KOS) with relationship models that help analysts synthesize 
information during analysis. 
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need for a more parsable publication format is also highlighted by the need to create tools 
like the Electronic Policy Improvement Capability (EPIC) in order to get a holistic view 
of the policy system created by the existing plethora of policy documents published by 
the USG.353 The previously-addressed failure of the JCCT and S&ED to properly track 
performance metrics also highlights the connectivity weaknesses in the current system.354 
While the visualization of a new government document publication format will 
necessarily require the development of new software, it would be more productive for 
government resources to focus solely on codifying the nodes and connective tissue of its 
foreign policy system in existing open source and extensible common data formats, and 
allow the software development community to focus on visualization and standardization 
of interactive systems. The existence of an authoritative data layer created by 
interconnecting policy nodes is likely more important than the visualization. 
3. Diplomats Unite: Encourage the Creation of a Joint FAO and FSO 
Epistemic Community 
While the codification of all U.S. foreign policy will dramatically sharpen the 
focus of the departments executing U.S. foreign policy, the Joint FAO and FSO epistemic 
community needs a way to communicate deeper ideas to each other and improve the 
USG-internal communication of foreign policy ideas. The community needs a collective 
journal,355 or some other way to report complex feedback from the front lines to each 
                                                 
353 See Carolyn Wong et. al., Using EPIC to Find Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Gaps in Department 
of Defense Policies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013) and Carolyn Wong, Daniel Gonzales, Authority to 
Issue Interoperability Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014) for details about EPIC. EPIC 
is a tool developed by the RAND Corporation for the automatic parsing of U.S. Government policy 
documents in order to better show semantically the responsibilities of specific actors that are spread across 
a wide variety of loosely-connected publications. The output results in a collection of semantic 
relationships in the form of “Actor --(executes)--> Action --(results in)--> Product. Impressively, the EPIC 
tool correctly found 94 percent of Program Manager Roles and Responsibilities statements in 21 policy 
documents. The need for such a tool as EPIC, though, highlights the poor framework that is currently being 
used to collect and organize the responsibilities that are expected of certain actors within USG. 
354 Office, U.S.-China Trade. Also see Phedon Nicolaides, “Economics of Policy Errors and Learning 
in the European Union,” European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe no. 31 (2013), 18 for 
a discussion of the importance of publishing one's failures as well as successes. 
355 Of note, the Foreign Area Officer Association does publish a journal. 
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other. Just like “Googlers” publish their work,356 it would potentially be productive for 
FAOs and FSOs to publish their findings as well. Such a journal could accept articles and 
theses from both FAOs and FSOs actively working abroad, and FAOs and FSOs in the 
training pipeline at academic institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School. If well-
advertised and linked or merged with other such professional publications within the U.S. 
Executive Department, it would likely provide not only a point of inspiration, but also a 
point of cohesion and discussion for the diplomatic community as a whole. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Does increasing the explicitness of foreign policies also increase their 
effectiveness? Yes. By modeling a foreign policy from a systems engineering 
perspective, and through an empirical analysis of U.S.-China relations since the founding 
of the PRC in 1949, I have shown that increasing the explicitness of a foreign policy also 
increases the effectiveness that foreign policy. It is likely that by improving upon the 
disaggregated and ambiguous nature of present foreign policy systems, the international 
community as a whole can focus more effectively on discovering an equilibrium more 
satisfying to both domestic and foreign stakeholders. Codifying and making explicit all of 
a state's foreign policies will allow the primacy and lasting nature of ideas to be lifted 
above the temporary nature of those individuals or organizations that espouse them. 
States began to make explicit their highest ideals in the form of Constitutions for exactly 
the same reason. The ambiguity of existing state foreign policy systems is likely 
preventing the world from establishing a better union. The challenges the world now 
faces are too complex and transnational for any government to tackle them alone, and the 
world shows no signs of becoming less complex. A more perfect union is the only way 
for representative governance to defeat the challenges to global peace and security that 
are to come. 
                                                 
356 See http://research.google.com/ for the latest work that Googlers are publishing. 
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